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Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying
Which Government Workers Are
Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed
Stacy M Lindstedt*
ABSTRACT
In 2007, Professor John Duffy wrote a brief article questioning whether
administrative patent judges are constitutional officers and therefore subject
to the Appointments Clause. A litigant latched onto the argument and chal-
lenged the validity of eight years of Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences determinations. Congress enacted a patch to provide for the appoint-
ment of patent judges, but the "Duffy Defect" did not stop there. Other
scholars have questioned the constitutionality of various government actors
from Bankruptcy Judges to the Pay Czar. The United States Tax Court dealt
with a recent Appointments Clause challenge when a taxpayer questioned
whether Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Appeals personnel who perform Col-
lection Due Process hearings or their managers must be appointed Given
the broad powers of the current administrative state, these questions are
bound to become common challenges to agency action and have strong po-
tential to halt the federal government unless legislative action is taken proac-
tively.
The Constitution provides little guidance on the characteristics that de-
fine an officer, noting only that an office must be "established by Law." The
Supreme Court has added that an officer is one who exercises "significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States. " This Article attempts to
define those phrases in a robust manner that preserves the separation of
powers and political accountability. It first reviews the Appointments Clause,
its history and purposes, and relevant legal precedent. To lend the reader
context, it summarizes the current Collection Due Process procedures and
describes the power the IRS Appeals Office holds. The Article analyzes the
Tax Court's holding, concluding that the Tax Court offers Congress a blue-
print to avoid the Appointments Clause. The Article suggests an alternative
framework for evaluating officer status and determines that IRS personnel
should be appointed. The Article concludes with a consideration of the ef-
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fects ofsuch a holding in the context of our current government structure and
political environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, a brief article by Professor John Duffy questioned the constitu-
tionality of the appointment method for Administrative Patent Judges. Duffy
argued that Administrative Patent Judges were at least inferior officers under
the Appointments Clause due to the substantial power they held - and with
that contention, questioned the validity of eight years of Board of Patent Ap-
2peals and Interferences determinations. The article made such an impact that
Congress enacted a statutory patch to correct the issue.3 But the spark didn't
die there - a series of articles followed "The Duffy Defect," 4 questioning the
applicability of the Appointments Clause to a range of government actors,
from Bankruptcy Judges to the Pay Czar.5 The impact of Duffy's article
reached courtrooms as well, prompting an Appointments Clause challenge in
Tucker v. Commissioner.6 In the United States Tax Court, Tucker argued that
1. John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?,
PATENTLY-O BLOG (July 23, 2007), http://www.patentlyo.com/lawjournal/files/Duffy.
BPAI.pdf.
2. Id. at 21-22. Although Duffy receives credit for highlighting the potentially
omnipresent officer-versus-employee problem, see Adam Liptak, In One Flaw, Ques-
tions on Validity of 46 Judges, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2008, at Al8; Harold C. Wegner,
The Duffy Defect, IP FRONTLINE IP & TECH. MAG. (Apr. 16, 2008),
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.aspx?id=18519&deptid-4, at about the same
time, David R. Stras and Ryan W. Scott also published an article questioning the
status of Senior Judges under the Appointments Clause - focusing on whether Con-
gress can delegate new duties to an existing officer without reappointment. David R.
Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
453, 494-95 (2007). This slightly different issue is likely to cause additional Ap-
pointments Clause challenges.
3. See Act of Aug. 12, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-313, §1(a), 122 Stat. 3014, 3014
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 6(d) (2006)).
4. Wegner, supra note 2.
5. See Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appoint-
ments Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (2008); Michael W. McConnell, The
Pay Czar Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at A25. In 2000, before
Duffy's article, the Supreme Court declined to reach the issue of whether the Ap-
pointments Clause applies to qui tam relators. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000). More recently, the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing on the constitu-
tionality of White House "Czars." Steven D. Schwinn, Do White House Czars Vio-
late the Appointments Clause?, CONSTITUTIONAL L. PROF BLOG (Oct. 7, 2009),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2009/1 0/do-white-house-czars-violate-the-
appointments-clause.html.
6. 135 T.C. 114 (2010); Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's Mo-
tion to Remand at 13 n.29, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (No. 3165-06L) (noting that the
1144 [Vol. 76
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Appeals Officers or their managers within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
are inferior officers of the United States because they provide statutorily re-
quired Collection Due Process (CDP) hearings.7 In 2010, the IRS Office of
Appeals received over 49,000 CDP hearing requests to determine whether it
would move forward with proposed liens or levies on delinquent taxes, and
that number increases each year.8 A determination that CDP conductors are
officers could halt compelled tax collection until appropriate personnel are
appointed. Even more concerning, such a holding could compel the same
result for similarly situated personnel in other federal agencies. A prime ex-
ample is the Social Security Administration, which received 408,314 requests
for benefit-determination hearings in the six months ending in March 2011.9
The Appointments Clause requires that officers of the United States be
appointed by one of its specified methods. Principal officers must be ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.10 With
statutory permission, inferior officers may be appointed directly by the Presi-
dent alone, the Courts of Law, or Heads of Departments." But the Constitu-
tion provides little guidance on the characteristics that define an officer. In
one of the most thorough opinions to address the distinction between consti-
tutional officers and mere employees, the Tax Court rejected Tucker's argu-
ments, ruling that neither Appeals Officers nor their managers are officers in
the constitutional sense and therefore need not be appointed.12 The court first
found the position of Appeals Officer was not "established by Law."' 3 The
court then found that IRS agents were mere employees because their deci-
sions were not the "last word" of the agency.14 The court further determined
that the statutes establishing CDP hearings assigned those duties to the entire
Office of Appeals, rather than to the named position of Appeals Officer, thus
precluding the application of the Appointments Clause.'5  The Tax Court
Appointments Clause challenge was prompted by Adam Liptak's article about
Duffy's article).
7. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 116.
8. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 49 tbl.21 (2010) (49,049 cases
received); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 49 tbl.21 (2009) (42,447 cases
received); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 49 tbl.21 (2008) (35,760 cases
received); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 47 tbl.21 (2007) (30,938 cases
received). These data reflect the fiscal years ending September 30 of the year stated.
9. Social Security Administration, Hearing Office Workload Data, HEARINGS
AND APPEALS, available at http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/02 HO Workload
Data.pdf (last visited May 30, 2011) (total number obtained by adding receipts for
each office as of March 2011; data on website may be updated).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
11. Id.
12. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 116-17.
13. Id. at 152.
14. Id. at 144, 163-64.
15. Id. at 158-59.
2011] 1145
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concluded that finding Appeals Officers to be constitutional officers would be
an inappropriate singling out, because a myriad of other administrative gov-
ernment actors who perform similar duties were not appointed.16 This Article
concludes that, in so holding, the Tax Court provides Congress with a blue-
print on how to circumvent the Appointments Clause.17
The Tax Court decision is on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit.' 8 But even if Tucker settles his appellate case, the
spark ignited by Duffy's article suggests that this issue will resurface, in and
out of the tax context, and in every circuit. This Article goes beyond Duffy's
brief analysis to explore the officer-versus-employee distinction that Tucker
highlighted and that is bound to become a common challenge to agency ac-
tion. Duffy looked at the question for patent judges, but this Article sets forth
a broader framework that can be applied to any government personnel. In
particular, this Article will focus on the requirement that an Office be estab-
lished by law and what it means for a government actor to exercise significant
or sovereign authority.'9
To that end, Part I of this Article reviews the Appointments Clause, its
history and purposes, and relevant legal precedent leading up to Tucker. To
lend the reader context, Part II summarizes the current CDP process and de-
scribes the power the IRS Appeals Office holds. Part III summarizes the
reasoning and holding in Tucker and analyzes the Tax Court's decision. Part
IV suggests an alternative analysis and, applying that framework, concludes
that Appeals personnel should be appointed. Finally, the Article discusses the
effects of such a holding and reviews the importance of the issue in context of
our current government structure and political state.
II. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
A. The Text, History, and Purposes
The Appointments Clause, article II, section two of the United States
Constitution, provides:
16. Id. at 165-66.
17. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991).
18. See Stipulation of Venue, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114, appeal docketed, No. 11-
1191 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011). Oral arguments are scheduled for February 6, 2012.
Tucker v. Commissioner, No. 11-1191 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 2011). The decision dis-
cussed in this Article was interlocutory, and the Tax Court decided the remaining
issues in Tucker v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307 (2011).
19. This Article does not address the requirement that a position be continuing.
See, e.g., United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898); Auffmordt v. Hedden,
137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890).
1146 [Vol. 76
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[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.20
Officers of the United States must be appointed by one of these methods if
their appointment method isn't provided by the Constitution itself.21
The clause serves several important purposes. First, colonists were tired
of dealing with offices the King created and filled that did no more than strip
them of resources.22 If legislative and executive powers are vested in the
same body, James Madison wrote, "there can be no liberty, because appre-
hensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical
laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner." 23 Thus the Appointments
Clause divides the powers to enact and to execute laws in order to prevent the
possibility that one branch of government could single-handedly create an
office and then fill it. Additionally, the legislative branch, with the bulk of
the law-making power, would not be tempted to create unnecessarily intru-
sive and powerful offices, because these offices would only strengthen a dif-
ferent branch, most often the executive.24
The Framers also recognized that "widely distributed appointment pow-
er subverts democratic government." 25 The Appointments Clause prevents
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
21. The Constitution provides appointment methods for the President, id § 1,
Vice President, id. Congressmen, id. art. 1, §§ 2-3; id. amend. XVII, and officers for
each house of Congress, id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 5.
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776) ("He has erected
a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people,
and eat out their substance.").
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 302-03 (James Madison) (G. P. Putnam's Sons
ed. 1908)).
24. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 905-06 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("One of the best securities against the creation of unnecessary offices or tyrannical
powers is an exclusion of the authors from all share in filling the one, or influence in
the execution of the other." (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, Madison's Observations on
Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, reprinted in 6 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 308, 311 (J. Boyd ed. 1952))). Justice Scalia noted that the first concern is
that legislators would appoint themselves to fill the positions created, but the Incom-
patibility and Ineligibility Clause wards off that evil. Id. at 904; see also U.S. CONsT.
art. 1, § 6, cl. 2. The evil next in line, however, remained - that legislators would give
the positions to their friends and political allies. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 904 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
25. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 885 (majority opinion).
2011] 1147
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this diffusion of the appointment power by keeping responsibility for officers
close to the top of the political chain within a limited number of identifiable
26
positions. The Framers vested this "most insidious and powerful weap-
on"27 in the Executive because one identifiable appointer (or a limited num-
ber of Heads of Departments) was thought to be held accountable more easily
than a blurred, multimember body.28 Therefore, as Tucker states, "when
Congress establishes an 'inferior Officer' in the Executive Branch, it can vest
the appointment power for that officer no further from the President than the
Head of a Department whom the President himself has appointed."29 This
restriction prevents Congress from "grant[ing] the appointment power to in-
appropriate members of the Executive Branch,"30 or in other words, from
watering down the appointment power.
Finally, this structure allows the American people to see which party is
responsible if officers go awry. The Framers understood that the President
would need help when taking care that the laws were executed faithfully but
insisted that he maintain political accountability for the actions of those indi-
viduals who aided him. 31 Presumably, such transparency would increase the
quality of appointees. As another byproduct, it may encourage the President
and Congress to work together when the public tires of delays in appointment
confirmations. 32
The text of the clause delineates between "inferior Officers" and officers
impliedly grander, which courts and scholars have dubbed "principal offic-
ers."33 Principal officers must be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate; however Congress, as it thinks proper, may direct
a less onerous appointment method for inferior officers. If Congress chooses
to do so, its choices are limited to removing the Senatorial advice-and-
consent requirement and allowing the President alone, Heads of Departments,
or the Courts of Law to appoint inferior officers. In essence, Congress's only
26. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at
878).
27. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787,
at 143 (1969).
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 455-57 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
29. Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114, 121 (2010). Recently, the Supreme Court
determined that a position that was subject to two levels of "for-cause" removal was
too far removed from the President's control under the Appointments Clause. Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010).
30. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880; see also id. at 904 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
Appointments Clause is, intentionally and self-evidently, a limitation on Congress.").
31. Stras & Scott, supra note 2, at 495-96 & n.300.
32. Id. at 495-96 n.300 (citing Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive
Understanding of the Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
467, 482 (1998)).
33. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 668 (1988).
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choice to simplify the process is to enhance the power of another government
branch. If Congress does not explicitly provide for an alternative appoint-
ment method, an inferior officer must be appointed by the full principal-
officer method.34
The Supreme Court and scholars have addressed the distinction between
a principal and an inferior officer.35 But a second distinction is at issue in
Tucker - whether Appeals Officers or Appeals Team Managers are officers at
all, and consequently, whether the Appointments Clause applies.36 Beyond
the phrase "established by Law" the constitutional text does not provide any
clues to what constitutes an officer.3 7
B. Defining Characteristics of an Officer
An officer under English common law was one the King enabled to
conduct the affairs of the government, becoming involved in the affairs of his
subjects without their consent.38 United States Supreme Court decisions,
colonial commentary, and the Constitution reflect a similar understanding. In
1926, the Supreme Court noted:
The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially
a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President alone
34. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997).
35. See id; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672; Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson
Still Good Law? The Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103, 1111 (1998). Morrison established factors to determine principal or infe-
rior status, but Edmond viewed inferiority to be largely, if not entirely, determined by
whether an officer's decision must be ratified by a superior officer before taking ef-
fect. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665. The Edmond Court utilized the factors from Morri-
son to evaluate whether the officer in question was in fact subordinate to another
officer. Id. at 667-68. For a recent case discussing the principal-inferior distinction,
see Masias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 634 F.3d 1283, 1293-95 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
36. Tucker concedes that if the CDP conductors or other IRS personnel are offic-
ers, they are inferior officers. Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's Motion
to Remand at 12, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (No. 3165-06L). Because no one in IRS Ap-
peals is currently appointed, Tucker, 135 T.C. at 116, if CDP conductors are inferior
officers then they violate the Appointments Clause. The IRS doesn't concede that
this means Tucker should get a new hearing, however. Respondent's Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Remand at 33, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114
(No. 3165-06L) (arguing in the alternative for validation of the CDP conductors' acts
by application of the de facto officer doctrine).
37. U.S. CONsT. art 11, § 2, cl. 2.
38. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments
Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 23-24 (2007) [hereinafter Officers] (citing King v. Burnell,
Carth. 478 (K.B. 1700)); see also id. at 22 (quoting P.G. Osborn, A CONCISE LAW
DICTIONARY 223 (2d ed. 1937)).
2011] 1149
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and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by
the assistance of subordinates. . . . As he is charged specifically to
take care that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable implica-
tion, even in the absence of express words, was that as part of his
executive power he should select those who were to act for him
under his direction in the execution of the laws. 3
The Take Care Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the
President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"40 but the
Appointments Clause provides the means to perform this task41 - the Presi-
dent may delegate a portion of his sovereign authority to officers "'who are in
conjunction with himself to execute the laws.'"42 An early American court
opinion defined a portion of the sovereign power as "a legal power, which
may be rightfully exercised, and in its effects will bind the rights of others,
and be subject to revision and correction only according to the standing laws
of the State."43 An influential nineteenth century treatise defined a public
office as "the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which . .. an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign func-
tions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.""
The 1899 Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives defined sov-
ereign authority as necessarily involving "'the power to (1) legislate, or (2)
execute law, or (3) hear and determine judicially questions submitted."' 45
The House further concluded that where a government actor had "'mere advi-
sory' responsibilities, without "'power to decide any question or bind the
Government or do any act affecting the rights of a single individual citizen,"'
he did not have sovereign authority. 4 6
39. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926), overruled in part by
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
41. Officers, supra note 38, at 14 ("President's authority to appoint and commis-
sion officers is 'the means of fulfilling' his obligation under the Take Care Clause"
(quoting Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890))).
42. Id. at 20 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1524, at 376 (Boston, Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833)).
43. Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273, 291 (1858).
44. Officers, supra note 38, at 29 (quoting FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS § 1, at 1-2 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co.
1890)).
45. Id. at 31 (quoting 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES § 493, 607 (Government Printing Office 1907)).
46. Id. at 32 (quoting 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES § 493, 610 (Government Printing Office 1907)).
1150 [Vol. 76
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47Meaningful case law on the officer-employee distinction is sparse.
Several early Appointments Clause cases took cursory looks at the officer-
employee distinction, sometimes relying entirely on whether the person had
48been appointed to determine if a person was an officer. In a similar shortcut
from early courts, officer status at times turned on whether the relevant stat-
utes established an appointment method. 49 Later courts employed a modified
version of this delineation, indicating that while a statutory method of ap-
pointment is not a requirement, if it exists it is an indicator of officer status.50
More recently, courts and commentators have recognized how unhelpful the-
se tests are in preserving the separation of powers under the Appointments
Clause.
Current Appointments Clause discussions generally date back only to
1976. In that year, the Supreme Court reviewed the established methods of
appointment for the members of the Federal Election Commission in Buckley
v. Valeo.52 The Commission had a variety of functions, including infor-
mation-reporting requirements, rulemaking duties (such as creating regula-
tions to carry out the Federal Election Campaign Act), and adjudicative duties
(such as determining individual candidate's eligibility for funds or to hold
47. See Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Liberty: The Appoint-
ments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1545
(1990) ("[A] definitive understanding of the term 'officer' is not forthcoming for two
simple reasons: (1) there are too few cases for any consistent precedential principle to
be articulated, and (2) the few cases that do exist posit conclusions rather than argu-
ments and provide little insight to justify their results.").
48. See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1878). It is possi-
ble that the Germaine Court was attempting to narrow the application of the statute in
question to those officers who were properly appointed because the statute was a
criminal one. Id. at 510 ("It is, therefore, not to be supposed that Congress, when
enacting a criminal law for the punishment of officers of the United States, intended
to punish any one not appointed in one of those modes.").
49. Bumap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516 (1920) ("Whether the incumbent
is an officer or an employ[ee] is determined by the manner in which Congress has
specifically provided for the creation of the several positions, their duties and ap-
pointment thereto."). The Burnap Court did not ultimately decide the case before it
on that issue. Id. at 517 ("There is no statute which creates an office of landscape
architect ... nor any which defines the duties of the position.").
50. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Freytag v.
Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991)).
51. See, e.g., id at 1132-33 ("[T]he earliest Appointments Clause cases often
employed circular logic, granting officer status to an official based in part upon his
appointment by the head of a department.").
52. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Court had previously noted what consti-
tuted an officer, but its references were often unhelpful recitations made in passing on
the way to reach other issues. See, e.g., Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510 ("That all persons
who can be said to hold an office under the government ... were intended to be in-
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office).53 By statute, the Commission was an eight-member body.54 The
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives were
nonvoting, ex officio members, and accordingly were not appointed at all.s
The remaining members were appointed in three different ways: two mem-
bers were to be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate with the
recommendations of the Senate majority and minority leaders, two more were
appointed by the Speaker of the House with recommendations from its major-
56ity and minority leaders, and the final two were appointed by the President.
The six appointed members were subject to the approval of both chambers of
Congress5 7 and could not be current government officials. The appellants
argued that the Commission violated the Appointments Clause because its
members were at least inferior officers of the United States and therefore
must be appointed by the limited mechanisms provided by the Constitution.59
The Supreme Court agreed. In finding the Commission's appointment
methods unconstitutional, the Court provided the current test, stating that
"Officers of the United States" include "any appointee exercising significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."60 Applying that test, the
Court categorized the Commission's duties into three types: informative,
adjudicatory or enforcement, and rulemaking. First, it found that the Com-
mission constitutionally exercised its investigative and informative duties,
noting that these duties fell "in the same general category as those powers
which Congress might delegate to one of its own committees."62 But, the
Court reached a different result for the Commission's "more substantial pow-
ers." 63 The Court rebuffed Congress's encroachment on the executive func-
tion and noted that the Commission's enforcement and rulemaking powers
were not "sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement of. .
. public law" to be exercised by nonofficers. 4 In short, the Court found the
Commission's rulemaking and adjudicatory powers to be significant authori-
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 109-13. Decisions were made by a majority vote. 2
U.S.C. § 437c(c) (2006); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 268 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
54. 2 U.S.C. § 437c; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 109.
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113.
56. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)(A); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113 n.156.
57. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113.
58. This included any elected or appointed officers and employees of any branch
of government. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2)-(3); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 268 (White, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 118-19.
60. Id. at 125-26.
61. Id. at 137.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 138.
64. Id. at 139.
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ty.65 The Court provided several specific examples of significant authority,
including the Commission's "discretionary power to seek judicial relief' 66
and its powers to make rules, to issue advisory opinions, and to determine a
candidate's eligibility for funds or eligibility to stand for federal elective of-
fice.67 The Court concluded that "each of these functions also represents the
performance of a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public
law."68
Concurring with the majority opinion, Justice Byron White noted that
the Commission members were plainly officers, largely due to the wide pow-
er they held without any executive or legislative supervision.69 Justice White
pointed out that the Commission did not deny that the members were officers,
but that it seemed to argue that Congress could nonetheless appoint them.70
He disagreed with the Commission, noting, "This position that Congress may
itself appoint the members of a body that is to administer a wide-ranging stat-
ute will not withstand examination in light of either the purpose and history
of the Appointments Clause or of prior cases in this Court."71 Justice White
concluded that the Appointments Clause prevents Congress from appointing
those individuals that enforce and administer the laws. 72
Thus, the important question after Buckley became: What constitutes
"significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States?" Fifteen
years later, the Court shed light on that question in Freytag v. Commissioner,
which involved several taxpayers who had deducted a total of $1.5 billion in
losses arising from an alleged tax shelter. 73 Under § 7443A(b)(1), (2), and (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code, the Chief Judge of the Tax Court may assign
limited types of cases to Special Trial Judges (STJs). 74 For these cases, STJs
may enter the final decision of the court. In addition, § 7443A(b)(4) gave
STJs authority to hear "any other proceeding which the chief judge may des-
65. Id. at 126.
66. Id. at 138.
67. Id. at 140-41.
68. Id. at 141.
69. Id. at 270 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
the FEC's only oversight, after appointment, required regulations issued by the Com-
mission to be approved by Congress).
70. Id. at 270-71.
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id. at 274 ("Under Art. 11 as finally adopted, law enforcement authority was
not to be lodged in elected legislative officials subject to political pressures. Neither
was the Legislative Branch to have the power to appoint those who were to enforce
and administer the law.").
73. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 871 (1991).
74. 26 U.S.C. § 7443A (1988) (amended 1998 & 2006).
75. Id § 7443A(c).
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ignate. For this broader delegation, however, the STJ's authority is limited
to making recommendations for the resolution of the case.77 In Freytag, with
the consent of the taxpayers, the Chief Judge assigned the billion-dollar case
to an STJ to make findings of fact and a proposed opinion pursuant to
§ 7443A(b)(4).78 The STJ proposed a ruling against the taxpayers, which the
Chief Judge adopted and entered as the decision of the court. 79 The taxpayers
argued for the first time on appeal that the appointment of STJs by the Tax
Court Chief Judge violated the Appointments Clause.80
In a brief discussion regarding whether STJs were officers, the court
noted without explanation that the STJ position was established by law and
that "the duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are specified
by statute."81 The court contrasted this example to Special Masters, whose
positions are temporary, not established by law, and whose "functions are not
delineated in a statute."82 The court noted that STJs perform "more than min-
isterial tasks," listing examples such as taking testimony, conducting trials,
ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and enforcing discovery orders. 83
The court observed that these duties required the exercise of significant dis-
cretion.84 Based on this analysis alone, the court seemed headed toward a
holding that STJs are officers.
In the following paragraph, however, the Court noted, "Even if the du-
ties of special trial judges under subsection (b)(4) were not as significant as
we and the two [lower] courts have found them to be, our conclusion would
be unchanged."85 The court explained that the Commissioner had conceded
STJs' inferior-officer status with respect to their duties under § 7443A(b)(1),
(2), and (3).8 This concession alone required appointment because "[t]he
fact that an inferior officer on occasion performs duties that may be per-
formed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not
transform his status under the Constitution."87
Landry v. FDIC, a 2000 decision from the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, provides another important look at significant au-
76. Id. § 7443A(b)(4). This provision is currently § 7443A(b)(7) due to other
additions to the STJ's final-decision-making powers. 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(b)(7)
(2006).
77. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 873; see also TAX CT. R. 182(e).
78. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 871.
79. Id at 871-72.
80. Id. at 892 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
81. Id. at 881 (majority opinion).
8 2. Id.
83. Id. at 881-82.
84. Id. at 882.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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thority. In Landry, the court considered the powers of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).89 The FDIC, a statutorily created agency,
oversees the banking industry and regulates federally insured entities.90 Its
oversight power includes the ability to remove bank officers and to prohibit
them from working in other federally insured institutions.9 1 If the FDIC pur-
sues a claim, the case is brought first before an administrative law judge
(ALJ), who holds a formal hearing and issues a recommendation to the FDIC
Board of Directors.92 The Board then issues the agency's determination after
a mandatory de novo review.93
In 1990, the FDIC pressured a Louisiana bank to obtain capital quickly
or face insurance termination.94 In "bizarre" attempts to solve the problem,
Michael Landry, a senior officer of the bank, admitted to self-dealing by try-
ing to "make money off the bank."95 In 1996, the FDIC sought to remove
Landry and to prohibit his further involvement with any FDIC-insured enti-
88. 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Tucker has appealed his case in the D.C.
Circuit. See Notice of Appeal at 1, Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114 (2010) (D.C.
Cir. May 17, 2011) (No. 3165-06L). Whether this venue is proper is a matter of cur-
rent debate. As a matter of administrative convenience, the Tax Court generally fol-
lows precedent from the appropriate appellate court for the given case. Golsen v.
Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). For CDP deter-
minations, the Tax Court has generally followed precedent from the circuit where the
taxpayer lived when he filed his petition. See, e.g., Baltic v. Comm'r, 129 T.C. 178,
180 n.5 (2007). One commentator, however, has pointed out an inconsistency with
the appellate venue statute and general practice. See James Bamberg, A Different
Point of Venue: The Plainer Meaning of Section 7482(b)(1), 61 TAX LAW. 445, 468-
69 (2008). The statute sets the D.C. Circuit as the default venue for review, but pro-
vides enumerated exceptions based on the content of the claim. 26 U.S.C. §
7482(b)(1) (2006). The exception followed by the Tax Court in CDP cases states that
venue should follow the taxpayer's residence when the amount of the tax is at issue.
Id. § 7482(b)(1)(A). Tucker, however, doesn't dispute the amount of tax owed.
Tucker, 135 T.C. at 115. Under Bamberg's reading of the statute, this leaves Tucker
to the default venue of the D.C. Circuit - where Landry is binding. Bamberg, supra,
at 446. The Tax Court has never ruled on this issue, but a taxpayer made a similar
argument in a motion currently before the court. Motion for Entry of Decision in
Favor of Petitioner, Asante v. Comm'r, No. 15914-10 (T.C. May 9, 2011). The mat-
ter will not be addressed in Tucker, as the Department of Justice stipulated to venue in
the D.C. Circuit. Stipulation of Venue, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (2010), appeal docket-
ed, No. 11-1191 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011).
89. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1128.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006); see also About FDIC, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/about/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
91. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1).
92. Id. § 1818(e)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 308.38(a) (2011).
93. Landry, 204 F.3d at 130 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 308.38-
.40).
94. Id. at 1128-29.
95. Id. at 1129-30.
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ties.96 As required, Landry's case first went to an ALJ for an on-the-record
hearing.97 The ALJ recommended Landry's termination and a prohibition
order.98 As required by statute, the FDIC Board of Directors reviewed the
ALJ's determination de novo.99 The Board adopted the ALJ's findings of
fact and issued the order against Landry. 0 0
On appeal, Landry argued that the ALJs were inferior officers, and
therefore, needed to be appointed.' Relying almost exclusively on Freytag,
the Landty majority compared the roles of the ALJs to the roles of Tax Court
STJs.102 The court found (again without explanation) that the AU position
was just as much established by law as the STJ position.lo3 The court noted
Freytag's reliance on discretion, calling it "rather a magic phrase under the
Buckley test."'4 Initially, the court expressed uncertainty as to the im-
portance of final decision-making power, 05 noting the seemingly contradicto-
ry import the High Court afforded an actor's ability to enter into a final
agreement.106 In the end, the court decided Freytag treated final decision-
making power as a critical distinction between employees and inferior offic-
96. Id. at 1128.
97. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-54 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). An "on the rec-
ord" or "formal" hearing has specific meaning within the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. § 554. The APA governs both formal and informal hearings,
but subjects formal hearings to more rules and procedures. Compare id., and id. §
553. Formal-hearing conductors have quasi-judicial powers such as the power to
administer oaths, issue subpoenas, rule on the admission of evidence, and take deposi-
tions. Id § 556(c). Arguably, formal hearings entitle the claimant to greater proce-
dural protections than informal hearings. "Off-the-record" or "informal" hearings are
not subject to the same strict rules. Correspondingly, informal-hearing conductors do
not explicitly have the right to perform the tasks listed above. See id. § 554. Practi-
cally speaking, an informal hearing conductor subject to court review must compile
some sort of record to support their decision. See, e.g., Memorandum of Center for
the Fair Administration of Taxes as Amicus Curiae at 12, Tucker v. Comm'r, 135
T.C. 114 (2010) (No. 3165-06L).
98. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1128.
99. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552.
100. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1128.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1133.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1134.
105. Id. at 1133 ("It is, to be sure, uncertain just what role the STJs' power to
make final decisions played in Freytag.").
106. Id. at 1134 ("[T]he Court introduced mention of the STJs' power to render
final decisions with something of a shrug . . .. Nonetheless, in another way the Court
laid exceptional stress on the STJs' final decisionmaking power.").
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ers.10 7 Thus, the court concluded that ALJs were not inferior officers because
they had merely recommendatory powers. os
Concurring in the judgment, the Honorable A. Raymond Randolph disa-
greed with the court's take on the importance of finality in the Freytag hold-
ing. He noted that the Freytag Court's discussion of finality was in an alter-
native holding, following a holding that indicated STJs were inferior officers
based solely on their § 7443A(b)(4) duties to hold hearings and recommend
an outcome to the Chief Judge.109 Judge Randolph compared ALJs to federal
magistrate judges who recommend findings and determinations to U.S. Dis-
trict Court judges.' 10 Judge Randolph noted that although those recommen-
dations, like the ALJs', must undergo de novo review, magistrates have long
been recognized as inferior officers and properly appointed by the Courts of
Law.111 Judge Randolph also noted that a lack of finality often indicates infe-
rior-officer status, as when a government actor exercising significant authori-
ty reports up the chain to a principal officer.112
A recent memorandum from the Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel' 13 suggests that Buckley's "significant authority" is equivalent to the
historical phrase "sovereign authority":
The Court's reference in Buckley (and subsequent cases) to the ex-
ercise of "significant authority," does vary somewhat from the well
107. Id. ("Accordingly, we believe that the STJs' power of final decision in cer-
tain classes of cases was critical to the Court's decision.").
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1142 (Randolph, J., concurring in result). Judge Randolph concurred
in the result because he believed Landry needed to - but hadn't - shown injury from
the lack of proper appointment. Id. at 1143.
110. Id.
I 11. Id.
112. Id. at 1142 (citing Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997)). In Ed-
mond, the Court reviewed the status of civilian judges in the Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals, but the question before the court was whether the judges were
inferior or superior officers. 520 U.S. at 655-56. Finding the judges to be inferior
officers, the Court noted, "What is significant is that the judges of the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States
unless permitted to do so by other Executive officers." Id. at 665.
113. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) is a body of specialized attorneys that
advises the President on constitutional matters. Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.justice.gov/olc/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) ("The
Office also is responsible for providing legal advice to the Executive Branch on all
constitutional questions .... ). The Department of Justice further characterizes the
OLC's work as "serving as, in effect, outside counsel for the other agencies of the
Executive Branch." Id. Although OLC's opinions do not provide binding legal prec-
edent, they are highly respected. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642-43
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established historical formulation, but nothing in the Court's opin-
ion suggests any intention to break with the longstanding under-
standing of a public office or fashion a new term of art. On the
contrary, the Court favorably discussed and cited several of the
cases from the 1800s reflecting that understandin , some of them
treating arguably insignificant positions as offices. 4
Yet, thirty-five years after Buckley, "significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States" remains relegated to definition by example. A few
common factors can be discerned: an actor that executes or administers public
laws in a nonministerial manner exercises significant authority, with finality
and discretion playing at least some role.
III. COLLECTION DUE PROCESS
In the Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA), Congress attempt-
ed to correct perceived tax collection abuses by giving taxpayers the right to a
last-chance appeal." 5 This last-chance appeal, called a Collection Due Pro-
cess or CDP hearing,1 6 requires the IRS Office of Appeals to hold such hear-
ings in specified circumstances.117 The statutes that require CDP hearings
and vest the IRS Office of Appeals with the power and duty to hold them are
found in the Internal Revenue Code:" 8
[Section] 6330. Notice and opportunity for hearing before levy
(b) Right to fair hearing. -
(1) In general. - If the person requests a
hearing in writing . . . and states the grounds
for the requested hearing, such hearing shall
be held by the Internal Revenue Service Office
of Appeals.
114. Officers, supra note 38, at 35 (citations omitted).
115. Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3401, 112
Stat. 685, 746; see also Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of
Tax Collection Decisions, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 429, 440 (2008).
116. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2006).
117. See 26 U.S.C. § 6320(b)(1) (2006); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(b)(1) (2011).
118. Section 6320 covers procedures for proposed or new liens filed by the IRS
while section 6330 applies to proposed levies. 26 U.S.C. § 6320; 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330.
Both statutes have near identical language regarding notice procedures and the right
to a fair hearing. 26 U.S.C. § 6320(a)-(b); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(a)-(b). Section 6320
refers readers to section 6330 for guidance on the conduct of the hearing. 26 U.S.C. §
6320(c) ("Conduct of hearing; review; suspensions. - For purposes of this section,
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(2) ....
(3) Impartial officer. - The hearing under
this subsection shall be conducted by an of-
ficer or employee who has had no prior in-
volvement with respect to the unpaid tax ...
before the first hearing under this section or
section 6320....
(c) Matters considered at hearing. -
In the case of any hearing conducted under this section
(1) Requirement of investigation. - The ap-
peals officer shall at the hearing obtain verifi-
cation from the Secretary that the requirements
of any applicable law or administrative proce-
dure have been met.
(2) Issues at hearing. -
(A) In general. - The person may raise
at the hearing any relevant issue relating
to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy,
including -
(i) appropriate spousal de-
fenses;
(ii) challenges to the appro-
priateness of collection ac-
tions; and
(iii) offers of collection alter-
natives, which may include
the posting of a bond, the
substitution of other assets,
an installment agreement, or
an offer-in-compromise.
(B) Underlying liability. - The person
may also raise at the hearing challenges
to the existence or amount of the under-
lying tax liability for any tax period if
the person did not receive any statutory
notice of deficiency for such tax liability
or did not otherwise have an opportunity
to dispute such tax liability.
(3) Basis for the determination. - The deter-
mination by an appeals officer under this sub-
section shall take into consideration -
(A) the verification presented under par-
agraph (1);
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(C) whether any proposed collection ac-
tion balances the need for the efficient
collection of taxes with the legitimate
concern of the person that any collection
action be no more intrusive than neces-
sary.
(d) Proceeding after hearing. -
(2) Jurisdiction retained at IRS Office of
Appeals. The Internal Revenue Service Office
of Appeals shall retain jurisdiction with re-
spect to any determination made under this
section, including subsequent hearings re-
quested by the person who requested the origi-
nal hearing on issues regarding -
(A) collection actions taken or proposed
with respect to such determination; and
(B) after the person has exhausted all
administrative remedies, a change in
circumstances with respect to such per-
son which affects such determination.11 9
The Office of Appeals must offer a taxpayer a CDP hearing after the
IRS has determined it will proceed with certain collection actions, such as
filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL)120 against a taxpayer or com-
mencing a levy against that taxpayer's assets or income.121 The taxpayer will
be offered a CDP hearing before any levy or garnishment begins, but an
NFTL typically is filed before the taxpayer receives the right to request a
119. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330 (italics added).
120. The moment an unpaid tax liability is assessed against a taxpayer, a federal
tax lien automatically arises against that taxpayer and his property, but a Notice of
Federal Tax Lien must be filed for the government to take priority over subsequent
creditors who otherwise did not have notice of the tax lien. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321,
6323(a), 6323(f)(1).
121. Not all collection actions are preceded by a CDP hearing. See id. § 6331. A
jeopardy assessment, for example, may be collected before the CDP hearing is of-
fered. Id. § 6331(a), (d)(3). A jeopardy assessment may happen when the IRS deter-
mines that the taxpayer appears to be planning to flee the country, hide or dissipate
assets, or if the taxpayer's financial solvency is in danger. Prince v. Comm'r, 133
T.C. 270, 276-77 (2009); Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1978). The
Supreme Court has determined that a predeprivation hearing is not constitutionally
required by the Due Process Clause because the Government's interest in collecting
taxes outweighs the individual's rights in this case. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
92 (1972); see also Cords, supra note 115, at 430 n.9.
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CDP hearing.122 If a taxpayer receives a notice that the IRS intends to begin a
new levy or has filed a new NFTL (for which he hasn't received a CDP hear-
ing before), he has thirty days to request the statutorily required CDP hear-
ing. 123 If the taxpayer's request is late, the Office of Appeals generally will
offer the taxpayer an "equivalent hearing" which is almost identical to a CDP
hearing but is not required by statute and is not subject to court review. 124
At a minimum, during a CDP hearing the Office of Appeals must con-
firm that the IRS met all legal and procedural requirements for making the tax
assessment,125 consider all legitimate issues raised by the taxpayer,126 and
balance the need for effective tax collection against the taxpayer's interests,
specifically considering whether the proposed collection action is more intru-
sive than necessary under the taxpayer's current circumstances.127 Under
current IRS procedures, Appeals Officers, Settlement Officers, or Appeals
Account Resolution Specialists may hold CDP hearings.128 Hearings can be
face to face, over the phone, or by correspondence.129 While the statutes are
silent on whether a taxpayer has a right to a face-to-face hearing, the IRS has
determined, and the Tax Court agrees, that a taxpayer only has a right to a
face-to-face hearing if he intends to discuss nonfrivolous issues. 130 A face-to-
face hearing may be denied if the taxpayer is not in compliance with current
122. The NFTL must be sent within five days after the filing of the federal tax
lien. 26 U.S.C. § 6320(a)(2).
123. Taxpayers generally request CDP hearings by submitting a Form 12153,
Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing. IRS, Form 12153 (re-
vised Mar. 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl2153.pdf.
124. See Orum v. Comm'r, 123 T.C. 1, 4-5 (2004); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(i)
(as amended in 2006).
125. An assessment is the recording of a tax liability on the books of the IRS. 26
U.S.C. § 6203; Billings v. Comm'r, 127 T.C. 7, 31 (1999), superseded by statute, 26
U.S.C. § 6015(e)(1), as recognized in Kosola v. Comm'r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1141
(2010).
126. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(c)(3)(B) (2011).
127. Id. § 6330(c)(3).
128. I.R.S. Deleg. Order Appeals-193-1, IRM Exh. 8.22.2-4 (Mar. 16, 2010)
(formerly I.R.S. Deleg. Order 8-a (Rev. 1)).
129. Katz v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 329, 337-38 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-
1 (d)(2), Q&A D6.
130. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A D8; see, e.g., Connolly v. Comm'r, 95
T.C.M. (CCH) 1371 (2008) (taxpayer didn't raise relevant issues to resolve); Ball v.
Comm'r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 7 (2006) (taxpayer wished only to raise tax-protestor
arguments). IRS Counsel has also determined that a taxpayer who fails to submit
completed financial information requested by the Office of Appeals may be denied a
face-to-face hearing if the hearing was solely to discuss collection alternatives which
require Appeals to review such documentation. Memorandum from Laurence K.
Williams, Senior Counsel, I.R.S. Office of Chief Counsel, Submission of Financial
Information as a Condition to Granting a Face-to-Face Collection Due Process Con-
ference, at 4 (Mar. 23, 2010), available at www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_2010-06.pdf.
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federal tax obligations, including estimated payments for the current tax
year.' 3 1 If a taxpayer is granted a face-to-face hearing, he has a statutory right
to audio record it at his own expense.132 Conversely, if a taxpayer is relegat-
ed to a telephonic hearing he is not allowed to record it.'33
CDP hearings are informal hearings and are not subject to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's on-the-record requirements.1 34  This designation
means that CDP hearings are subject to fewer rules and regulations than for-
mal hearings.' 35 A taxpayer is not under oath during a CDP hearing and is
allowed to present evidence on any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax,
the pending collection action or proposed collection alternative.136 CDP con-
ductors do not have the power to subpoena third parties, and taxpayers do not
have a right to subpoena and examine witnesses.'3 7 Accordingly no statute
authorizes CDP conductors to issue discovery orders; however, they can re-
quest to use the IRS's summons power to obtain information from third par-
ties. Whether taxpayers are allowed to present witnesses at the hearing
seems to be within the discretion of the CDP conductor.' 39 The CDP conduc-
tor does not rule on evidentiary questions and must consider anything rele-
vant the taxpayer brings forward.140 The conductor retains discretion regard-
ing when to conclude the CDP hearing and whether to extend its boundaries
beyond the required elements. 14 A less-formal record, but one sufficient for
abuse-of-discretion review, must be compiled for any possible appeal to the
Tax Court. 142
131. See Williams v. Comm'r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 25 (2008). These failings would
render a taxpayer ineligible for collection alternatives in any case. See Gillum v.
Comm'r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 562 (2010).
132. 26 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006); Keene v. Comm'r, 121 T.C. 8, 19 (2003)
(finding 26 U.S.C. § 7521 applies to face-to-face CDP hearings).
133. Calafati v. Comm'r, 127 T.C. 219, 229 (2006); see also 26 U.S.C. §
752 1(a)(1) (recording limited to "in-person interview[s]").
134. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-l(d)(2) Q&A D6.
135. See id.
136. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(c)(2)(A) (2011).
137. Davis v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 35, 41 (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-
1(d)(2), Q&A D6.
138. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (2006).
139. See, e.g., Swann v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1006 (2003) (taxpayer wit-
ness attended hearing); Smith v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 889 (2003) (same).
140. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(c)(2)(A), (3)(B). Of course the CDP conductor must
determine what is relevant. See Connolly v. Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1371 (2008).
141. I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2006-019, at 33 (Aug. 18, 2006), available
at http://www.unclefed.com/ForTaxProfs/irs-ccdm/2006/cc-2006-019.pdf ("An ap-
peals officer may, in that appeals officer's sole discretion, consider issues precluded
under sections 6015(g)(2), 6330(c)(2)(B), or 6330(c)(4).").
142. See Barnes v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (CCH) 1126 (2010) (citing Wright v.
Comm'r, 381 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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At the hearing, the taxpayer can raise any relevant issues about the
Commissioner's collection activities such as an innocent-spouse claim,143
challenges to appropriateness of intended collection action,1" or alternative
collection suggestions. 145 Potential collection alternatives include proposed
installment agreements,146 partial payment installment agreements,147 or of-
fers in compromise.148 Alternatively, the CDP conductor may put a taxpayer
into currently not collectible (CNC) status. CNC status doesn't relieve the
taxpayer of liability but halts collection efforts because the IRS recognizes in
certain circumstances that collecting any tax would leave the taxpayer unable
to meet basic living expenses.149 No dollar limits exist for what may be con-
143. Under limited circumstances, an innocent-spouse claim can relieve a taxpay-
er of all or a portion of liability for taxes incurred by a spouse. 26 U.S.C. § 6015; see
also Wilson v. Comm'r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1552 (2010); Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2
C.B. 296.
144. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(c)(2)(A).
145. Id.
146. Installment agreements allow a taxpayer to make payments over a defined
time until the debt is paid off in full. See 26 U.S.C. § 6159; IRM 5.14.1.1 (June 1,
2010).
147. Partial-payment installment agreements also allow the taxpayer to make
payments, but in the end, the entire tax debt does not get paid. See 26 U.S.C. § 6159;
IRM 5.14.2.1 (Mar. 13, 2011).
148. An offer in compromise (OIC) is an agreement that settles tax liabilities for
less than what was originally owed based on one of three grounds: doubt as to liabil-
ity, doubt as to collectability, or effective tax administration. See 26 U.S.C. § 7122;
Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b) (2002). OIC's often involve a lump-sum payment but
can consist of limited payment plans. IRM 5.8.1.8.4 (Mar. 16, 2010); Offer in Com-
promise, IRS, Form 656 (revised March 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-pdf/f656.pdf. The IRS will generally accept an offer that is higher than a taxpay-
er's "reasonable collection potential" (income less necessary expenses), but it can
accept lower offers or reject higher offers. See Murphy v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 301,
309-10 (2005) (describing the offer-in-compromise process), aff'd, 469 F.3d 27 (1st
Cir. 2006).
149. See IRM 5.16.1.1 (Apr. 29, 2011). The IRS may put a taxpayer in CNC
status instead of accepting an offer in compromise, for example, if it believes the
taxpayer might be able to pay more in the future. See IRM 1.16.11 (Apr. 29, 2011).
In CNC status, taxpayers do not have to make payments, but their tax liability still
exists and penalties and interest still accrue. I.R.S. Pub. 4418 (Mar. 2008). The ten-
year collections statute does run. See 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1); IRM 16.1.2.2.4 (May 5,
2009). The IRS will generally still put a lien on a taxpayer's assets while he is in
CNC status if his outstanding balance is higher than the general lien threshold. See
IRM 5.16.1.1(4) (Apr. 29, 2011). The IRS recently increased this lien threshold from
$5,000 to $10,000. Nicole Duarte, IRS Raises Lien Threshold, but Former Officials
Say More Improvements Are Needed, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 25, 2011, available at
2011 TNT 38-2 (LEXIS); see also Adjustments to Lien Policies, INTERNAL REVENUE
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sidered or decided within a CDP hearing.150 A taxpayer also may challenge
the amount of taxes due, or the "underlying liability," at a CDP hearing if he
did not have the chance to do so previously.'15  A CDP hearing reviews the
decision of the IRS to institute a lien or levy at that time,' 52 and many out-
comes don't preclude the IRS from revisiting the issue later, potentially im-
posing a new lien or levy. Some payment alternatives allow the IRS to re-
view the taxpayer's financial situation periodically,1 53 and some alternatives
require biennial review. 54
Appeals Team Managers supervise CDP conductors and are responsible
for the final determination of the hearing.155 The CDP hearing officially ends
when the Team Manager issues a notice of determination.156 The notice pro-
vides written evidence of the Office of Appeals' decision and starts the clock
on a thirty-day window for the taxpayer to petition the Tax Court for re-
view. 15 7 If the taxpayer did not challenge his underlying tax liability (or isn't
allowed to because he had a prior opportunity), the Tax Court reviews Ap-
150. See 26 U.S.C. § 6320 (2006); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330.
151. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(c)(2)(B). This can happen when a CDP hearing stems
from taxes that the taxpayer self-reported. Montgomery v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 1, 9-10
(2004) (taxpayers who self-reported tax liability had not had a prior opportunity to
dispute it). In Tucker, the IRS asserts that if a taxpayer properly challenges the under-
lying liability, that portion of the hearing is referred to an Appeals Officer, regardless
of who was holding the original hearing. See Respondent's Supplemental Memoran-
dum at Law at 2 n.2, Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114 (2010) (No. 3165-06L) ("In-
ternally, however, the IRS uses the terms settlement officer and appeals officer to
distinguish between those appeals employees who generally make collection determi-
nations, settlement officers, and those Appeals employees who generally make liabil-
ity determinations, appeals officers.").
152. If a taxpayer's biweekly wages are to be garnished, for example, then the
taxpayer will not receive new CDP hearings every two weeks. Treas. Reg. §
301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A D1 (as amended in 2006). Further, if a taxpayer faces a lien
and levy for the same tax year or tax years, then an effort will be made to consolidate
the hearings. Id. at Q&A D2.
153. For example, the Internal Revenue Code allows the IRS to "alter, modify, or
terminate" an installment agreement if it determines that the taxpayer's financial
circumstances have "significantly changed." 26 U.S.C. § 6159(b)(3).
154. If a taxpayer is in a partial-payment installment plan, the IRS must review his
financial circumstances at least once every two years. Id. § 6159(d).
155. I.R.S. Deleg. Order Appeals-193-1, IRM Exh. 8.22.2-4 (Mar. 16, 2010)
(formerly I.R.S. Deleg. Order 8-a (Rev. 1)).
156. Turner v. Comm'r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1173 (2010) ("All communications
between the taxpayer and the Appeals officer between the time of the hearing request
and the issuance of the determination notice constitute part of the CDP hearing.").
157. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(d)(1). Currently the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction
over CDP hearing reviews. See, e.g., Dibble v. IRS, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5176
(W.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that review of CDP determinations after October 16,
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peals' determination for an abuse of discretion. When a taxpayer makes an
innocent-spouse claim or appropriately challenges his underlying tax liability,
the Tax Court reviews that determination de novo.15 Tax Court decisions are
appealable to Federal Courts of Appeals, and for individuals, most often ven-
ue is in the jurisdiction where the taxpayer resided when he filed the Tax
Court petition.160 The appellate courts review the Tax Court's fact finding for
clear error and its application of the law de novo.1 From the appellate level,
a taxpayer may petition the United States Supreme Court for review.162
Though Congress mandated the CDP hearing process in 1998, the IRS
Office of Appeals and the position of Appeals Officer existed long before the
RRA.163 The Office of Appeals' stated mission is to "resolve tax controver-
sies, without litigation, on a basis which is fair and impartial to both the Gov-
ernment and the taxpayer."16 As such, the Office of Appeals provides a last
effort by the IRS to settle matters before they reach court. Through Appeals,
taxpayers may enter payment plans, defer payment, or compromise their tax
liability. 16 The Appeals Office also retains jurisdiction for CDP cases after
court review.166 If a taxpayer's financial circumstances change and he has
exhausted all administrative remedies, the Appeals Office may reconsider its
determination.167 In addition, the Appeals Office offers "equivalent hearings"
if the taxpayer fails to request a CDP hearing on time, but requests a hearing
within one year of the notice advising him of the right to a CDP hearing.168
Equivalent hearings in practice are nearly identical to CDP hearings, but the
IRS provides them voluntarily (without a statutory mandate), and the taxpay-
158. Sego v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 176,
181-82 (2000).
159. Porter v. Comm'r, 132 T.C. 203, 210-11 (2009) (innocent spouse); Davis v.
Comm'r, 115 T.C. 35, 39 (2000) (underlying liability).
160. 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b) (2006). But see supra note 88.
161. 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) (requiring the same deference as if they were deci-
sions from a federal district court, in a civil action tried without a jury); see, e.g.,
Green v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 857, 866 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Arevalo v. Comm'r, 469
F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2006)).
162. 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).
163. Tucker notes that the Office of Appeals has existed in some form or another
since 1918, and the IRS created the position of Appeals Officer in 1978. Tucker v.
Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114, 134-36 (2010).
164. IRM 8.1.1.1(1) (Oct. 23, 2007); Appeals . . . Resolving Tax Disputes,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERv. (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/individuals/content/0
,,id=98196,00.html.
165. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii) (2011).
166. Id. § 6330(d)(2).
167. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(h) (as amended in 2006).
168. See id. § 301.6330-1(i), Q&A 17 (Under § 6330, a taxpayer has a year from
the date the CDP notice is issued, but under § 6320 the taxpayer must file within the
"one-year period commencing the day after the end of the five-business-day period
following the filing of the NFTL.").
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er does not have a right to judicial review. In addition, the statute of limi-
tation and collection actions are not tolled or stayed for an equivalent hear-
ing.170 In 1996, two years before the RRA was enacted, the Office of Ap-
peals instituted the Collection Appeals Process (CAP), a program for taxpay-
ers to contest IRS collection decisions such as imposing a lien or a levy.' 7 1
CAP hearings bear striking similarity to CDP hearings,172 though the IRS
continues to conduct CAP and CDP procedures separately. 173 CAP hearings
are more widely available than the statutorily created CDP hearings but, like
equivalent hearings, taxpayers do not have a statutory right to a CAP hearing,
determinations flowing from CAP are not appealable to any court and collec-
tion actions and the statute of limitations are not affected by CAP hearings.174
IV. TUCKER V. COMMISSIONER
Larry Tucker owes back taxes.175 He doesn't deny this fact, nor the
amount the government seeks, but he wants to pay it back on his terms pursu-
ant to an offer in compromise.176 Under the CDP framework, as long as
Tucker's repayment suggestion fits certain criteria set by the IRS, generally
169. See id. § 301.6330-l(h)(2), Q&A H2 ("Only determinations resulting from
CDP hearings are appealable to the Tax Court.").
170. See id. § 301.6330-1(i)(2), Q&A 13.
171. IRM 8.24.1.1.1 (May 27, 2004). This is not the same CAP as the Compli-
ance Assurance Program, which involves larger corporate taxpayers and continuous
audits. I.R.S. Announcement 2005-87, 2005-2 C.B. 1144.
172. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A D6 (noting similarity between
CAP and CDP hearings). The government contends that the RRA codified CAP,
adding only the right to raise collection alternatives and the right to judicial review.
Respondent's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Remand
at 28, Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114 (2010) (No. 3165-06L).
173. See IRM 8.24.1.1.1 (May 27, 2004); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2),
Q&A D6; I.R.S. Pub. 1660, 3 (Rev. June 2011) ("You may appeal many IRS collec-
tion actions to the IRS Office of Appeals (Appeals) . . .. The two main procedures are
Collection Due Process and Collection Appeals Program.").
174. I.R.S. Pub. 1660, 3. In addition to the times CDP hearings are available,
CAP hearings are available after the termination or rejection of an installment agree-
ment and the denial of an offer in compromise. Id. at 1. One treatise also notes that
under CAP procedures the Appeals Officer was limited to reviewing the proposed
collection action and could not consider other appropriate collection alternatives.
Robert E. McKenzie & Jaqualin Friend Peterson, Prior Rights, in 14 MERTENS LAW
OF FED. INCOME TAX'N § 49E:20 (West 2011) ("The prior administrative appeals
procedure did not grant such broad authority to the Appeals Officer.. . . The Appeals
Division was not given the authority to find best remedy for the taxpayer.").
175. Carlton M. Smith, Does Collection Due Process Violate the Appointments
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the law says he should be able to do So.177 But the Settlement Officer that
heard Tucker's case didn't think his offer met the IRS criteria, nor did the
Appeals Team Manager that signed off on the decision to reject it. 1 Tucker
first argues that the relevant statutes require that an Appeals Officer - as op-
posed to a Settlement Officer - conduct the hearing, but the Tax Court has
rejected this argument before.179 In the alterative, Tucker argues that regard-
less of who holds the hearing, that person is an inferior officer under the Con-
stitution and therefore must be appointed. 1o Tucker doesn't argue that Ap-
peals Officers were constitutional officers before the RRA was enacted, but
focuses on the performance of statutorily required CDP hearings entitled to
judicial review.i Tucker in essence argues that when Congress named Ap-
peals Officers in the Internal Revenue Code, their positions became statutori-
ly required.182 In the alternative, Tucker claims that the Appeals Team Man-
agers, as the final "deciders" of Appeals' determinations, are officers and
must be appointed.183 Essentially, Tucker argues that someone in Appeals
has been delegated and is exercising significant authority pursuant to the
RRA and therefore must be appointed.
The Government instead argues Congress did not name the specific po-
sition of Appeals Officer in the Code, but merely referred to "appeals officer"
in the general sense of an employee of Appeals.184 It argues that the individ-
uals who decide CDP hearings do not hold positions established by law and
that conducting CDP hearings does not amount to an exercise of significant
177. An IRS actor has discretion to choose not to follow the established criteria in
the guidelines, but is subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review in Tax
Court. See Woodral v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999) ("In order to prevail, a tax-
payer must prove that the Commissioner exercised this discretion arbitrarily, capri-
ciously, or without sound basis in fact or law.").
178. Smith, supra note 175, at 777-78.
179. See Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114, 153-55 (2010) (citing Powers v.
Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 318 (2009); Reynolds v. Comm'r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 260
(2006)).
180. See id. at 116.
181. Tucker doesn't pursue this argument for Appeals Officers before the enact-
ment of the RRA because it isn't necessary to his case; though he does not concede
that they were not constitutional officers before the RRA. See Petitioner's Supple-
mental Reply Memorandum at 20-21 & n.13, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (No. 3165-06L).
182. Tucker also argued that § 3465(b) of the RRA mandates the existence of
Appeals Officers by requiring that "[t]he Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall
ensure that an appeals officer is regularly available within each State." Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3465(b), 112 Stat. 685, 768; see
Tucker, 135 T.C. at 155-56.
183. Reply Memorandum at 9, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (No. 3165-06L); see also
Smith, supra note 175, at 778-79.
184. Transcript of Record at 6, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (No. 3165-06L).
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authority. ss The Government also argues that the notice of determination
issued at the end of the CDP hearing is not a final agency determination, and
therefore, no one in Appeals exercises significant authority. 8 6 The Govern-
ment concedes that the positions in question are continuing,' 87 and no one
contends that any personnel in Appeals are appointed currently.
A. The Tax Court's Decision
Tucker defines officers as" 'any appointee exercising significant authori-
ty pursuant to the laws of the United States' including 'all appointed offi-
cials exercising responsibility under the public laws of the Nation,"' but ex-
cluding lesser functionaries subordinate to an officer.'8 To begin, Tucker
reviews the Office of Appeals and its long history.' 90 Tucker notes that the
RRA marked the first time that the Office of Appeals was mentioned directly
in statute - but that this reference did not establish the office that had existed
in some form for eighty years, but "presume[d] its prior existence." 19 ' Simi-
larly, Tucker points out that Appeals Officers, a specific position within Ap-
peals, have existed and performed many of the same functions required by the
CDP statutes for years.' 92 The Tax Court notes that, although the Office of
Appeals existed before the RRA, it is arguable that the multiple references to
the Office in that Act now require its existence.' 93 The court dismisses that
argument as irrelevant because, it says, the issue is not whether the Office
itself was established by law but whether any position within that Office was
established by law.194
Tucker then questions whether CDP determinations are final. 195 The
court looks at the myriad of circumstances when the taxpayer and Appeals
might meet again after a CDP hearing or when a determination made by Ap-
peals may be altered or abandoned in the future.196 The court notes, for ex-
ample, that the statute provides for retained jurisdiction within the Office of
Appeals, signaling that Congress recognized that the notice of determination
185. See Respondent's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion
to Remand at 1, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (No. 3165-06L).
186. See id
187. Id at 6-7 n.5.
188. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 116.
189. Id. at 123 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, 131 (1976) (per curi-
am)).
190. Id. at 134-36.
191. Id
192. Id. at 136.
193. Id. at 153 n.69.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 140.
196. Id. at 140-44.
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might not conclude the matter forever.' 97 Appeals can revisit a collection
action, for instance, if a taxpayer's financial circumstances change.198 More
importantly for determining finality, the court says, the IRS Chief Counsel
who argue the case in front of the Tax Court are not bound by the reasoning
or positions within Appeals' notice of determination.199 Extending the finali-
ty requirement to other agencies, the court notes that if a taxpayer brings a
refund suit in federal district court, the Department of Justice is not bound by
the Appeals Office's reasoning or determination in defending the suit.200
Finally, Tucker notes that CDP determinations do not have res judicata or
collateral estoppel implications for either party, and therefore cannot be fi-
nal.201 The court also reviews the differing circumstances when a taxpayer
can get subsequent relief from an adverse decision, even a court decision, and
concludes "there are numerous circumstances in which [CDP] determinations
may not be the IRS's last word."202
Tucker looks to other administrative positions for comparison and con-
cludes that the "CDP hearing officer .. . is by no means unique in the context
of administrative adjudication."203 It reviews the powers of administrative
law judges (ALJs) employed by the federal government, who hold on-the-
record hearings governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).204
The APA authorizes ALJs "to require attendance at the hearing, to administer
oaths and affirmations, to issue subpoenas, to rule on offers of proof and re-
ceive evidence, and to order depositions."205 Tucker concludes that these
powers are greater than the powers wielded by an informal-hearing conductor
206
such as an Appeals Officer. Having determined that the Office of Appeals
and Appeals Officers existed before the RRA, CDP determinations are not
197. Id. at 141.
198. Id. at 143 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(2)(B) (2006)).
199. Id. at 143-44 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 601.106(a)(1)(i), (d) (2011); Rev. Proc. 87-
24, 1987-1 C.B. 720; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Order No. 4 (Jan. 19, 2001)). This blanket
statement is somewhat misleading. Under the authorities cited by the Tax Court, IRS
Chief Counsel or the Department of Justice may abandon arguments or reasoning
adopted by the IRS Appeals Office and can settle cases in certain circumstances.
Courts, however, in conducting an abuse-of-discretion review, cannot uphold an ad-
ministrative action on grounds not advanced by the agency in the original determina-
tion. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). Therefore, although IRS
Chief Counsel and the Department of Justice may settle cases out of court on their
own theories or abandon arguments made by the Appeals Office, they cannot advance
new reasoning to uphold Appeals' determination.
200. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 146-47.
201. Id. at 145-46.
202. Id. at 149.
203. Id. at 151-52.
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-57 (2006)).
206. Id. at 152, 165.
2011] 1169
27
Lindstedt: Lindstedt: Developing the Duffy Defect
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
final, and CDP conductors are less powerful than their AU counterparts,
Tucker turns to an analysis of the officer test.
Tucker applies a three-part test for officer status: (1) the position must
be established by law, and it must be an office, meaning (2) the position must
exercise significant authority, and (3) the position must be continuing. 207 The
court begins with the "threshold trigger" that a position is established by
law.208 First, the court notes that the CDP conductor position is not expressly
established. 209 For example, the court points out, no statute says, '[t]here
shall be, within the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals, officers des-
ignated as Appeals Officers, who shall conduct CDP hearings."'2o The court
contrasts this lack of statutory language with other positions clearly set out in
statute, citing Landry and Freytag.211 The court admits this lack of express
establishment cannot be dispositive but says it gives some indication of of-
ficer status.21 Second, the court notes that the RRA assigned duties to the
preexisting Office of Appeals, in contrast to other circumstances when Con-
213gress has created entirely new positions. This finding, too, weighed against
finding officer status. Finally, the court rejects that the RRA established any
individual position by law because it assigns the responsibility for CDP hear-
214ings not to a specific position but to the entire Office of Appeals. The
court determines that although the statutes use the phrase "appeals officer,"
Congress used the phrase in a generic way to mean a representative of the
Appeals Office, rather than specifying the distinct position of Appeals Of-
215ficer. Buttressed by the statute's requirement that an impartial "officer or
207. Id. at 152, 159-60. The IRS conceded in this case that Appeals Officers'
positions are continuing. Id. at 160.
208. Id. at 152 (quoting Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
209. Id. at 153.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 152-53.
212. Id. at 153 (noting that a lack of explicit establishment by statute is "some
indication that the position in question is not an office 'established by Law"'); id. at
158 ("[I]f the phrase 'established by Law' were construed to mean that the Appoint-
ments Clause can apply only to a position expressly created by a statute, then abuses
could arise.").
213. Id. at 153.
214. Id. at 155.
215. Id. As a basis for this conclusion, Tucker relies in part on legislative history
that "on one occasion" used the term "appeals officer" immediately followed by the
more generic term "appellate officer." Id. at 154-55. The court implies this was the
only time the phrase "appeals officer" was used in the relevant legislative history and
read its nexus to the more general phrase "appellate officer" to signify that Congress
was using "appeals officer" in a generic sense. Id. On a review of the legislative
history cited by the court, however, the term "appeals officer" is actually cited ten
times, with "appellate officer" on its heels only in the instance cited by the Tax Court.
H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 263-66 (1998). The term "appellate officer" is used one
additional time (not immediately following mention of an "appeals officer"), when
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employee" hold the hearing, Tucker finds that Congress did not intend to
assign these duties specifically to the preexisting position of Appeals Of-
ficer.216 The court notes it is impossible "to point to a position responsible
for conducting CDP hearings and to question whether the person in that posi-
tion was an 'inferior Officer."' 217 Thus the court concludes that the RRA did
not establish any position and that the statute uses "appeals officer" to refer to
any employee of the Office of Appeals who holds CDP hearings.218
Although Tucker decides the CDP conductor position was not estab-
lished by law, the court continues to analyze whether CDP conductors exer-
cise significant authority. 219  Analyzing Buckley, Tucker notes significant
authority could include the power to issue "determinations without supervi-
sion under an Act of Congress."22o But Tucker also concludes that the Frey-
tag Court, in finding officer status, relied heavily on the ability to issue final
decisions with "independent authority," 221 as did the D.C. Circuit Court of
222Appeals in Landry. Specifically, Tucker notes that the Landry ALJs did
not have significant authority because their decisions were not final, despite
their power to hold formal on-the-record hearings.223 Tucker reasons that
CDP conductors, responsible for mere informal hearings, have less authority
224than the ALJs in Landry. Therefore, because it had found that CDP deter-
minations are not final and because CDP conductors have fewer and lesser
powers than on-the-record hearing conductors, the court determines no one in
the Office of Appeals exercises significant authority.225
the conferees note that "to the extent practicable, the same appellate officer will hear
the taxpayer with regard to both lien and levy issues." Id. at 266.
216. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 154 ("This shows that Congress did not use the term
'officer' in any specialized sense.").
217. Id. at 155.
218. Id. Tucker also considers whether a position established by administrative
regulations can be considered "established by Law." Id. at 156-59. Tucker points out
that several appellate courts have held that positions established by regulation may
require appointment, but it does not appear the established-by-law criteria was chal-
lenged in those cases. Id. at 156-58 (citing Willy v. Admin. Review Bd., 423 F.3d
483 (5th Cir. 2005); Holtzclaw v. Sec. of Labor, 172 F.3d 872 (6th Cir. 1999); Vama-
dore v. Sec. of Labor, 141 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1998); Pennsylvania v. HHS, 80 F.3d
796 (3d Cir. 1996)).
219. Id. at 159-60.
220. Id. at 162.
221. Id. at 163.
222. Id. ("This lack of finality led the Court of Appeals to conclude that the ALJs
in question are not officers.").
223. Id. at 164-65 ("Despite this authority [to hold on-the-record hearings], the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the ALJs in Landry are
not officers because they lack final decisionmaking power.").
224. Id. at 165.
225. See id. at 164-65.
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Tucker concludes by reiterating that CDP conductors do not exercise au-
thority as significant as their counterparts in many other administrative agen-
cies who hold on-the-record hearings.226 "To survey these thousands of em-
ployees important to the administration of law and single out IRS 'appeals
officers' as somehow requiring constitutional appointment would be unwar-
ranted." 227
B. Weaknesses in Tucker
Beginning with the only clue from the constitutional text, the Tax Court
recognizes that an office must be "established by Law." 228 From there, Tuck-
er analyzes ways in which an Appeals Officer is not established by law, but
never defines the phrase.229 For example, Tucker notes that no statute estab-
lishes the position of Appeals Officer and specifically finds that the RRA did
not create a new position.230 Tucker also relies on Congress's use of the
phrase "officer or employee" in one section of the RRA to indicate that Con-
231
gress did not intend to create an office. The factors the Tax Court consid-
ered thus imply a definition: a position is established by law if it is (1) ex-
pressly set out in statute (or perhaps regulations), and (2) was not a preexist-
ing position; alternatively, a position is established by law if there is some
manifestation of congressional intent to establish an office.232
All of these factors - whether a position is set out expressly in statute,
whether a position is preexisting, and whether Congress manifests an intent to
create an office - are inappropriate to test whether an office exists because
they are subject to congressional manipulation. Tucker itself recognizes that
a position need not be created explicitly by statute as Congress could skip this
233step intentionally to avoid the Appointments Clause. But excluding gov-
ernment actors with preexisting positions involves the same danger. Con-
gress could assign duties to a preexisting nonofficer and thereby retain con-
trol over appointments or allow a more diffuse appointment method than the
process that would otherwise be constitutionally required. Likewise, reliance
on congressional intent to create a formal office places officer status squarely
226. Id. at 165.
227. Id. at 165-66.
228. Id. at 152.
229. Id. at 153-56.
230. Id. at 155.
231. Id. at 154.
232. Presumably, if an office could be established by regulation, the intent that
would be relevant would be that of the promulgating agency.
233. Id. at 158 ("For example, Congress could take a pre-existing low-level posi-
tion (which had been created by the Executive Branch pursuant to a general authoriza-
tion like section 7804(a), and which was not subject to appointment by the President
or a Head of a Department) and could invest it with significant additional power, thus
evading the Appointments Clause by seeming to avoid 'establishing' the office.").
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within the control of Congress because Congress controls the manifestations
of its intent. For example, Congress could fail to provide for formal ap-
pointment although it intends to delegate significant authority. Thus, Tuck-
er's established-by-law analysis gives Congress a blueprint234 to avoid the
Appointments Clause - create what would otherwise be an office by assign-
ing significant authority to a preexisting nonofficer and add the words "or
employee" to destroy any presumption of officer status.
Although Tucker determines CDP conductors are not established by law,
it reviews whether they exercise significant authority. Tucker holds that CDP
conductors and Appeals Team Managers do not have significant authority
235because their decisions are not final. The most troubling assertion in this
context is that finality means the absolute "last word."236 Tucker's definition
of finality requires that the IRS, and even other agencies, 237 never be allowed
to revisit the issue, even in the taxpayer's favor.238 Tucker also imposes judi-
cial requirements in an agency context by holding that the notices of determi-
nation are not final because they do not trigger res judicata or collateral es-
toppel.239
Tucker relies on Landry for placing dispositive weight on finality in de-
termination of significant authority.240 Even assuming that Landry's empha-
sis on finality is a correct interpretation of Freytag (which is not clear2 41),
Landry does not define final as the last word, but by contrast to "recommend-
atory power." 242 The ALJs did not issue the final decision because the FDIC
Board was required to review their determinations de novo and make its own
findings of fact.243 In this structure, the ALJ's decisions had no force without
the Board's sanction.244 This structure is similar to how the IRS has struc-
tured CDP hearings, in that Appeals Team Managers review determinations
of CDP conductors, and the managers make the determination that is subject
to court review.245 But this realization should not end the inquiry because
234. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991).
235. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 164.
236. Id. at 143-44, 149.
237. Id. at 146-47 (noting that a CDP determination is not binding because the
Department of Justice would not be bound by it in defending a later refund suit in
district court); id at 141 n.57 (noting same for Department of Justice defending an
action to quiet title).
238. Id. at 147.
239. Id. at 146.
240. Id. at 163-65.
241. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
242. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
243. Id. at 1130.
244. Id.
245. I.R.S. Deleg. Order Appeals-193-1, IRM Exh. 8.22.2-4 (Mar. 16, 2010)
(formerly I.R.S. Deleg. Order 8-a (Rev. 1)). There does not seem to be a published
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Tucker also challenges the Appeals Team Managers' authority. Therefore,
before concluding, the court should look more closely at the constitutional
status of Appeals Team Managers or perhaps at whether the IRS's imposed
structure of CDP hearings comports with the requirements of the RRA.
The Tax Court's formulation of finality leaves little, if any, room for a
decision to be final. Tucker notes, for example, that if a CDP notice of de-
termination sustained a lien, the IRS could later determine to release it.246
The STJs in Freytag, or even presidentially appointed Tax Court judges,
could not pass this test. After any decision, the Tax Court retains discretion
to grant a new trial, reconsider findings of fact, and vacate or revise deci-
247
sions. On the other hand, even if the Tax Court did not change its mind,
the IRS could choose not to enforce the judgment against the taxpayer, per-
haps due to a later innocent-spouse claim or changed financial circumstances
- the equivalent of parties settling after obtaining a court ruling.248 These
later events do not change the final character of the court's original decision.
Applying this narrow definition of finality, Congress would be free to grant
itself appointment power over Tax Court and other judges whose decisions
are not the absolute last word.
The scope of a CDP hearing is also important. What is at issue in a
CDP hearing is a particular collection episode: either one collection action (a
lien) or the beginning of a series of related collection actions (a levy) at that
time.249 The Tucker court views this limited scope as a sign of lesser authori-
ty.250 But this type of review is similar to a lawsuit in which Article III judg-
standard of review for CDP determinations within the Office of Appeals, and nothing
otherwise suggests that Appeals Team Managers are required to give deference to the
CDP conductors' findings.
246. See Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114, 141-42 (2010).
247. TAX CT. R. 161 (reconsideration of findings or opinion with or without a new
trial); TAX CT. R. 162 (vacate or revise decision). Although the Rules contain general
thirty-day deadlines, any finality gleaned from those limits is negated by the addition
of "unless the Court shall otherwise permit." TAX CT. R. 161-62. These rules are
similar to the retained jurisdiction provisions of the RRA. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(d)
(2011). The Government notes that a retained-jurisdiction hearing will only be grant-
ed if a taxpayer alleges that "the original determination is not being followed or that it
should be reconsidered because the taxpayer's circumstances have changed for the
worse." Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Supplemental Memorandum of Law and
the Center for the Fair Administration of Taxes' Amicus Curiae Memorandum at 12,
Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (No. 3165-06L).
248. See Memorandum of Center for the Fair Administration of Taxes as Amicus
Curiae at 19, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (No. 3165-06L).
249. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(1)-(d)(2), Q&A Dl (as amended in 2006). If
the IRS asserts a new tax for the same year, the taxpayer would receive a new hearing
even if the old tax was settled or in repayment. Id. § 301.6330-1(d)(1)-(d)(2), Q&A
D6.
250. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 164.
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es are limited to the case or controversy before them.251 A judge who does
not settle all future breaches or disputes regarding a contract, for example,
still exercises significant authority.
Additionally, finality may look different to an agency than it does to a
court. To impose judicial standards of finality such as res judicata and to
consider finality dispositive implies that only the judiciary or those individu-
als acting in a judicial capacity may exercise significant authority. Yet histor-
252ically this implication is not true. At the time the Supreme Court discussed
finality in Freytag, the majority did not view the Tax Court in an administra-
tive light, which explains the Court's discussion of res judicata and collateral
estoppel as elements of finality without discussion of the potential administra-
tive context.253 Those considerations are appropriate for evaluating the finali-
ty of a court decision but should not be applied in an administrative context
without consideration of whether the agency acted in a judicial capacity.254
Even accepting Tucker's equation of "final" with "last word," the court
admits that in some circumstances the determination made at Appeals binds
255the government. Under Freytag, this power is enough. If a government
actor performs any duties that amount to significant authority (and the other
requirements are met) then he must be appointed.256
251. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
252. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133-34, 271 (1976) (per curiam) ("Neither
has it been disputed and apparently it is not now disputed that the Clause controls the
appointment of the members of a typical administrative agency . . . ."); id. at 139
(finding rule-making powers to be significant authority); id. at 126 (citing Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (postmaster first class recognized as an officer); Ex
parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 225 (1839) (clerk of district court)).
253. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (5-4 decision) (finding the Tax
court to be a court of law). But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Over-
sight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (adopting the position that the Securities and
Exchange Commission is an Executive department because it is a "free-standing, self-
contained entity in the Executive Branch" (quoting Freylag, 501 U.S. at 915 (Scalia,
J., dissenting))).
254. Agency determinations generally do trigger res judicata when the agency acts
in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino,
501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (stating that res judicata should apply when an "issue has
been decided by an administrative agency, be it state or federal, which acts in a judi-
cial capacity") (citation omitted); United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384
U.S. 394, 422 (1966) ("When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity
and resolve[s] disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an
adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to
enforce repose."), superseded by statute, Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-563, 92 Stat. 2383.
255. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 145 n.60.
256. Freylag, 501 U.S. at 882 (finding that if an actor was an officer for some of
his duties then he was an officer for all of them).
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Tucker also finds that the Appointments Clause doesn't apply if signifi-
cant authority is assigned to an entire office, rather than to a particular posi-
tion.257 The court declines to impose responsibility because it can't tell who
is doing what.258 The court notes, "After the enactment of this statute, it was
not possible to point to a position responsible for conducting CDP hearings
and to question whether the person in that position was an 'inferior Of-
ficer."' 259 Taking that reasoning to its logical conclusion provides Congress
yet another route to bypass the Constitution. Congress could assign the duty
to enforce a certain statute, for example, to an existing department composed
entirely of nonofficers and then claim appointment rights for all employees of
that department.
The Tucker court fell into the same trap when it examined whether any
position within Appeals was established by law. While admitting that the
multiple references to the Appeals Office in the RRA arguably required its
existence (presumably meaning that the Office arguably was established by
law), the court found this conclusion to be irrelevant because it denied that
any specific position was required by the RRA.260 Yet, if the RRA requires
CDP hearings to be performed by the Appeals Office, then someone must
exist within that office to conduct them. Thus those personnel - the CDP
conductors - are required by the RRA. The specious distinction between the
Office of Appeals and a specific position therein creates a gap for Congress to
abuse the appointment power. As Tucker's counsel notes, "Congress cannot
get around the Clause merely by not giving a name to an employee to whom
it delegates significant authority [of the United States]." 26'
Finally, the Tax Court improperly views a decision that Appeals Offic-
ers or Appeals Team Managers need to be appointed as singling them out
among various government actors with similar authority.262 Deciding the
case at hand cannot be considered unfair attention. The CDP conductor and
Appeals Team Manager are the only positions the Tax Court was charged
with evaluating and the only positions that had interested parties fully arguing
that case before it.263 Furthermore, Tucker implies that because some similar
positions are not appointed currently, then CDP conductors should not be
appointed either. This reasoning is reminiscent of the early decisions that
257. See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 153.
258. See id at 155.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 153 n.69.
261. Carlton M. Smith, Does the Failure to Appoint Collection Due Process
Hearing Officers Violate the Constitution's Appointments Clause?, 10 J. TAX PRAC. &
PROC. 35,42 (2008) [hereinafter Smith, Failure to Appoint].
262. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 165-66.
263. The court did request briefing on similarly situated government actors, but
this cannot substitute for individual review of a particular position by interested par-
ties. Order dated Jan. 16, 2009, Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (No. 3165-06L).
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held that the method of appointment indicates officer status.264 It is possible
that, upon scrutiny, courts would find those individuals holding similar posi-
tions to be constitutional officers in violation of the Appointments Clause. Of
course, the Tax Court's apparent concerns about the disruption to government
are valid and practical. The Supreme Court, facing similar arguments in
Buckley, replied, "[O]ne cannot dispute the basis for this sentiment as a prac-
tical matter . . .. But such fears, however rational, do not by themselves war-
rant a distortion of the Framers' work."265 If the Tax Court is concerned with
consistent application of the Appointments Clause and perhaps wishes to
minimize the disruption its decision may cause, the most valuable thing it
could do is establish a robust, explicit framework for distinguishing an officer
from an employee. One suggestion for such a framework follows.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Established by Law and Significant Authority
Tucker does not define what it means by the phrase "established by
Law," and its implied definition does not protect the separation of powers and
political accountability. A more workable definition reads "established by
Law" to mean that the two requirements for officer status - exercising signif-
icant or sovereign authority and holding a continuing position - must be
themselves established by law. That is, they must be set forth by some legal
authority. 266 This definition provides a path for courts to assess objectively
whether an office was established by law without resorting to the intent of
Congress. Congressional intent is important, but courts should not ask
whether Congress intended to create an office, but whether Congress intended
to (and did) delegate sovereign authority to a continuing position. Within
these confines, Congress could refer to a position in any manner it likes and
264. See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1878).
265. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 134 (1976) (per curiam).
266. This definition was offered to the Tucker court through the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) memorandum. See Officers, supra note 38, at 120. Tucker dismissed
the directly-on-point memorandum in a footnote by characterizing its argument as:
"[I]f the positions existed, then the positions were 'established by law."' Tucker, 135
T.C. at 157-58 & n.77. The court noted that "the assumption is problematic, in that it
risks reading out of the Constitution the phrase 'established by Law', if the Appoint-
ments Clause would mean the same thing with or without that phrase." Id. at 158.
Admittedly, the Tax Court's formulation of the OLC's position would be a poor ar-
gument. But the Tax Court misreads the memo, which instead defines "a position,
however labeled" as an office if "(1) it is invested by legal authority with a portion of
the sovereign powers of the federal Government, and (2) it is 'continuing."' Officers,
supra note 38, at 1. Specifically, it interprets the words "established by Law" in the
Appointments Clause to mean that these two essential elements of an office must be
set forth by some legal authority. Id. at 120.
2011] 1 177
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delegate sovereign authority to preexisting positions or entire offices but
would not be able to break out of its constitutional confines.
Tucker next addresses "significant authority" by reviewing the CDP
conductor's ability to issue a final decision, holding that one factor to be dis-
positive.267 Tucker's holding is in line with several formulations of signifi-
cant authority that define it as encompassing the power to bind the govern-
ment.268 The view that reconciles more compelling precedent, however, is
that finality is a strong indicator of significant authority, though there may be
instances where an actor exercises significant authority yet is subject to re-
view. For example, the Landry majority noted that purely recommendatory
powers were not "fatal in themselves," and other courts have considered a
lack of finality to mean that the actor is an inferior as opposed to principal
officer.269 In Buckley, the Supreme Court noted that power to issue advisory
opinions can constitute significant authority but found that information-
270gathering and investigative duties do not2. One potential inference is that an
actor with recommendatory powers is not exercising significant authority if
he performs information-gathering and investigative duties. This interpreta-
tion preserves a court's ability to review an actor's full range of responsibili-
ties in context to determine if he is an employee, an inferior officer or a prin-
cipal officer.
More disturbing, however, is Tucker's equation of finality with "last
word," which leaves little room for any government actor to be considered an
officer. A better test of finality, especially in the administrative context, is
the developed administrative-law definition, because it measures the power of
a government actor to administer the laws.271 Administrative law finality is
"generally understood to mean [an] action which is necessary and sufficient
for judicial review."2 72 In the administrative context, final is not the "last
word" possible but is defined in juxtaposition to preliminary, procedural, or
267. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 164-65.
268. See Officers, supra note 38, at 32 (quoting 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS'
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 493, 610 (Government Printing
Office 1907)).
269. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that the Frey-
tag Court did not indicate that "purely recommendatory powers [are] fatal in them-
selves"); id. at 1142 (Randolph, J., concurring in result) (citing Edmond v. United
States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)).
270. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137, 140-41.
271. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 241-43 (1980); Duffy,
supra note 1, at 23 ("The power to reach a final administrative decision - one that the
courts are required to respect with deference - surely means that the members of the
[Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences] are exercising significant authority under
the law and are thus officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause.").
272. See Sec'y of Educ. Review of A.L.J. Decisions, 15 Op. O.L.C. 8, 10 (1991).
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intermediate.273 In a 1991 opinion, the OLC noted that an administrative
action can be "final" even if it is subject to review within the administrative
agency, because it found that, "'[fjinal agency action' . . . is a familiar and
well-developed term of administrative law referring to the action after which
judicial review may be available." 274 This formulation abides by five criteria
the Supreme Court identified that demonstrate finality in the administrative
context: To be final, the administrative action should (1) be a definitive
statement of the agency's position; (2) have a direct and immediate effect; (3)
have the "status of law;" (4) be such that immediate compliance with the de-
termination is expected; and (5) concern a legal question "fit for judicial reso-
lution."275 Thus, finality in part measures when a decision is entitled to judi-
cial review.276  "[T]he relevant considerations in determining finality are
whether the process of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage
where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and
whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences
will flow from the agency action." 277
Some commentators perceive an additional requirement that the decision
receive some level of deference upon review. 278 Administrative finality thus
may incorporate degrees of review. An actor whose decisions are always
subject to statutorily mandated de novo review before taking effect would be
least likely to be an officer. On the opposite end of the spectrum, an actor
whose determinations have immediate effect without further approval by the
agency (i.e., can be followed immediately by judicial review) likely would be
exercising significant authority.279 If the administrative decision is entitled to
273. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); see also Sec'y of Ed. Review of A.L.J. Decisions,
supra note 272, at 10 ("Under these authorities, an agency's decision need not be its
last word on a subject to be considered 'final agency action."' (citing Standard Oil,
449 U.S. 232; Carter/Mondale Presidential Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 711 F.2d 279 (D.C.
Cir. 1983))).
274. Sec'y of Ed. Review of A.L.J. Decisions, supra note 272, at 7.
275. Carter/Mondale, 711 F.2d at 286 (citing Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 239-40);
see also Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 241-43 (finding issuance of a complaint was not a
final agency action because it had "no legal force or practical effect upon [the compa-
ny's] daily business other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation").
276. Carter/Mondale, 711 F.2d at 285 n.9 ("[W]e conclude ... Congress also
assumed that '[a]gency action made reviewable by statute' would be final action."
(alteration in original)).
277. Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U.S. 62, 71 (1970) (citations omitted).
278. Duffy, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999)).
279. This spectrum could also inform the debate between an inferior and principal
officer. Judge Randolph, concurring in Landry, pointed out a potential problem if the
imposition of review and the applicable standard are chosen and implemented by the
agency: "It would be odd for the constitutional status of a special trial judge to depend
on an internal rule of procedure, particularly since the Tax Court had discretion to
2011] 1179
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deference from the reviewing tribunal, the case is stronger that the adminis-
trative actor who made the decision was exercising significant authority:
where "administrative adjudicators render either final agency decisions or
decisions that are entitled to deference at the next stage of administrative
review, the government has consistently conceded that the adjudicators are
officers subject to the Appointments Clause." 280
This definition of administrative finality mirrors the discussion of signif-
icant authority. A final decision in the administrative context is one that has
281immediate legal effect on a citizen without further action by the agency.
This definition corresponds with the suggestion that actions taken must have
immediate legal consequences without further review to amount to significant
authority. 282 Equating significant authority to administrative finality also is
consistent with the reasoning in Landry. Landry found that the ALJs were
not officers because they merely made recommendations to the FDIC Board
that made the final agency determination. 283 If the ALJs performed their du-
ties, but the Board did not act, Landry might still be in banking today. The
ALJ's decision would not be considered a point of finality in administrative
law, and correspondingly, was not considered significant authority.284
Beyond finality, the Supreme Court provides several other examples of
what constitutes significant authority. Buckley found that when government
actors move beyond the types of duties that Congress could delegate to its
own staff and into the administration and enforcement of public law, they
285become officers. Buckley provided examples such as having the power to
make rules, issuing advisory opinions, or determining eligibility for funds or
office.286 Freytag added to the list items that were "more than ministerial
tasks," such as taking testimony, conducting trials, ruling on the admissibility
287
of evidence, and enforcing discovery orders. Consistent with these authori-
ties, the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that sovereign authority encom-
passes "binding the Government or third parties for the benefit of the public,
pick whatever standard of review it saw fit." Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1141-
42 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring).
280. Duffy, supra note 1, at 24 (citing Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180,
186-88 (1995); Willy v. Admin. Review Bd., 423 F.3d 483,491 (5th Cir. 2005)).
281. See Carter/Mondale, 711 F.2d at 286 (citing FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 449 U.S. 137, 239-40 (1980)).
282. Officers, supra note 38, at 32 (quoting 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS'
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 493, 610 (Government Printing
Office 1907)).
283. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1130 (citing 12 CFR § 308.38-.40).
284. See Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 246-47 (holding that an intermediate decision
without immediate legal consequences is not final).
285. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137-38 (1976) (per curiam).
286. Id. at 140-41.
287. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991).
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such as by administering, executing, or authoritatively interpreting the
laws."288
Landry also noted that "exercis[ing] significant discretion" was "a mag-
ic phrase under the Buckley test."289 Discretion seems to play a similar role
as finality. Its existence indicates significant authority, but its absence does
not preclude officer status.290 Freytag suggests that a high level of discretion
may outweigh an actor's lack of final decision-making power.291 Responding
to the Commissioner's argument that STJs were not officers because they
could not enter final decisions in § 7443A(b)(4) cases, the Court said "this
argument ignores the significance of the duties and discretion that special trial
judges possess." 292
Tucker determined that because Congress delegated these duties to an
entire office there was no position established by law.293 The State of Ohio
faced a similar scheme in 1857 and concluded:
It is true, the general assembly seems to have carefully avoided
giving to the defendants any official name or designation. But
surely this is immaterial to the question. The official or unofficial
character ... is to be determined, not by their name, nor by the
presence or absence of an official designation, but by the nature of
the functions devolved upon them.... [T]he mere fact that their
294functions are nameless can not alter the case.
Rather than allowing Congress to circumvent the Constitution this way, judg-
es should ask whether Congress delegated significant authority on a continu-
ing basis. If so, whoever legally exercises that authority is a constitutional
officer.295
The Tucker court faced another interesting problem. After Congress
delegated significant authority to someone in the Appeals Office, the IRS
288. Officers, supra note 38, at 9-10.
289. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
290. Pennsylvania v. HHS, 80 F.3d 796, 802 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The broad discre-
tion and authority vested in the Board clearly establishes that its members are officers
and not employees . . . ."); Officers, supra note 38, at 54-55 ("Buckley did rightly
indicate that discretion in administering the laws typically will constitute the exercise
of delegated sovereign authority, and therefore is of course relevant. . . . But Buckley
did not say, nor does it follow, that such discretion is necessary.").
291. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
292. Id.
293. Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114, 155 (2010).
294. State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St. 546, 557-58 (1857).
295. The Tax Court recognized there was a sort of unnamed, de facto position
created by the RRA when it held that "an 'appeals officer' is any 'officer or employ-
ee' in the IRS Office of Appeals to whom is assigned the task of conducting a CDP
hearing under section 6330(b)(3)." Tucker, 135 T.C. at 155.
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internally split the baby by giving authority to exercise the statutorily man-
dated duties to one group and the authority to make the corresponding final
decision to another group.296 Neither Congress nor an agency should be able
to avoid the Constitution in this way.297 Assuming this split is a permissible
action under the RRA, someone still should be appointed if the RRA dele-
gates significant authority. Pragmatism suggests that the final decision maker
be deemed as exercising the statutory duties because he or she holds the ulti-
mate authority to ensure that the law is enforced. This construction preserves
an agency's authority and flexibility to structure its own procedures within
the bounds of the law, without discouraging internal review of enforcement
actions. As an indirect benefit, assuming those supervisors who have the
final say are fewer in number, this construction would minimize the adminis-
trative disruption of a holding that someone in the Office of Appeals must be
appointed. Most importantly, this construction prevents Congress or adminis-
trative agencies from subverting the Appointments Clause by dividing the
statutorily required duties from the related final decision-making power.
B. Application to Tucker
Applying this alternative framework to Tucker, whether any position in
Appeals is established by law would hinge on whether anyone exercised sig-
nificant authority delegated by legal authority. 298 The RRA mandates that
CDP hearings must occur and the Office of Appeals must perform them.299
Congress delegated the following powers and duties when appropriate: de-
termination of a taxpayer's liability; determination of whether the taxpayer
will be granted relief from that liability; determination of whether an alterna-
tive payment plan is appropriate, including the ability to accept a lesser
amount than is owed from the taxpayer in satisfaction of the entire liability;
and determination of whether to proceed with a lien or levy on a taxpayer's
assets or wages, including the ability to decide whether the proposed collec-
tion action would cause a hardship and whether the proposed collection ac-
tion balances efficient tax collection with the corresponding intrusion into the
taxpayer's life.300
Performing CDP hearings involves administering and enforcing public
laws, specifically the RRA. While a CDP conductor or Appeals Team Man-
296. I.R.S. Deleg. Order Appeals-193-1, IRM Exh. 8.22.2-4 (Mar. 16, 2010)
(formerly I.R.S. Deleg. Order 8-a (Rev. 1)).
297. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880 ("The structural interests protected by the Ap-
pointments Clause are not those of any one branch of Government but of the entire
Republic.").
298. In a case where it is not conceded, the court would also need to review
whether the positions are continuing. See, e.g., United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331,
377-78 (1898); Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890).
299. See 26 U.S.C. § 6320 (2006); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330 (2011).
300. See 26 U.S.C. § 6320; 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330.
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ager cannot do the exact same things as the STJs in Freytag (such as ruling
on the admission of evidence or administering oaths), the duties prescribed by
the RRA are more than ministerial. For example, CDP conductors can hear
301
witnesses and evaluate evidence. More significantly, CDP conductors or
the Appeals Team Managers determine on the government's behalf whether
to proceed with a direct enforcement action on a taxpayer's assets. 302 The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has called an enforcement action "the para-
digm of 'direct governmental authority."' 303 The Tucker court focuses on the
limited scope and jurisdiction of the CDP conductor's review, but CDP con-
ductors also can compromise or forgive a liability on behalf of the govern-
ment and determine a taxpayer's liability.3 04
Furthermore, CDP conductors and Appeals Team Managers exercise an
incredible amount of discretion, including the ultimate ability to treat similar-
ly situated taxpayers differently. 305 The statutory language used in the RRA
demonstrates that the CDP conductor has discretion by requiring the conduc-
tor to consider all relevant issues raised and "whether any proposed collection
action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legiti-
mate concern of the person that any collection action be no more intrusive
than necessary."306 The deferential abuse-of-discretion review standard itself
states that CDP conductors exercise discretion.307 While CDP hearings are
not on-the-record proceedings, this fact arguably increases the CDP conduc-
tor or Appeals Team Manager's discretion because they are bound by fewer
rules and requirements.3
CDP conductors and Appeals Team Managers have the power to affect
the interest of individuals because, in an administrative sense, CDP determi-
nations are final. Although the IRS could revisit CDP determinations in lim-
301. See supra notes 138, 140 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
303. FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
304. See Kindred v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The decision to
entertain, accept or reject an offer in compromise is squarely within the discretion of
the appeals officer .... ").
305. Jaffe v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1349 (2004) ("[T]he settlement discre-
tion given to the IRS . . . is 'at its heart a discretion to treat similarly situated taxpay-
ers differently."' (quoting Bunce v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 500, 509 (1993))).
306. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330(c)(3) (2011).
307. See Smith, Failure to Appoint, supra note 261, at 43.
308. A. Lavar Taylor from the Center for the Fair Administration of Taxes points
out a CDP conductor's additional discretion, provided by I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice
CC-2006-019, at 33 (Aug. 18, 2006), available at http://www.unclefed.com/ForTax
Profs/irs-ccdm/2006/cc-2006-019.pdf, to determine when to conclude the CDP hear-
ing and to consider issues otherwise precluded by statute. Memorandum of Center for
the Fair Administration of Taxes as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Tucker v. Comm'r, 135
T.C. 114 (2010) (No. 3165-06L). It is beyond the scope of this Article whether dis-
cretion provided by the IRS Chief Counsel is relevant to the evaluation of significant
authority under the Appointments Clause.
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ited circumstances, the notice of determination is not a preliminary, procedur-
al, or intermediate step. 309 It has real and immediate consequences for the
taxpayer, including a trigger of available court review.310  If the taxpayer
misses the window for review, the IRS can enforce the CDP determination,
including confiscation of the taxpayer's property, without further notice.
And if a requirement of deference upon review exists, it is easily met. The
Tax Court reviews CDP determinations for an abuse of discretion except
312
when certain claims are involved. But under Freytag, because the deter-
minations are reviewed with deference for at least some of the cases, some-
one in Appeals is exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States and must be appointed.3 13 In sum, a CDP determination is an
enforcement action against a taxpayer with immediate consequences, and
therefore its issuance cannot be said to be "sufficiently removed from the
administration and enforcement of the public law as to permit [its] being per-
formed by persons not 'Officers of the United States."'
314
Assuming the IRS's internal delegation of final decision-making author-
ity to Appeals Team Managers is valid, then at least Appeals Team Managers
should be appointed under the Appointments Clause. In the current CDP
process, personnel conducting the hearings are similar to the ALJs in Landry
with mere recommendatory power. Appeals Team Managers issue and sign
the notice of determination.3 15 Without the sanction of the Appeals Team
Manager, the CDP conductor's determination does not have any effect on the
316taxpayer. Determinations by Appeals Team Managers do have legal con-
sequences for taxpayers without further action by the IRS.317 Although the
309. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
310. A notice of determination, by the Tax Court's parlance, is often called a
"'ticket' to the Tax Court." Weber v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 258, 263 (2004) (citing
Offiler v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 492, 498 (2000)).
311. Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due? I.R.C. Sections 6320 and 6330
Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51, 78 (2004) ("When a taxpayer
fails or refuses to schedule a hearing, the Appeals officer has no choice but to issue a
determination based on the available record so that collection can continue.").
312. See Sego v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Comm'r, 114 T.C.
176, 181-82 (2000).
313. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991) (finding that if an actor is an
officer for some of his duties then he must be appointed).
314. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139, 141 (1976) (per curiam); see also FEC v.
NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
315. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
316. See I.R.S. Deleg. Order Appeals-193-1, IRM Exh. 8.22.2-4 (Mar. 16, 2010)
(formerly I.R.S. Deleg. Order 8-a (Rev. 1)) (providing nondelegable authority to Ap-
peals Team Managers to review and approve CDP determinations).
317. A determination letter approved by an Appeals Team Manager provides the
jurisdictional basis for Tax Court review and starts the clock on the taxpayer's right to
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statute does not mention Appeals Team Managers, even Tucker agrees an
office need not be created explicitly.318 By overseeing the CDP hearings and
issuing the final determinations, the Appeals Team Managers administer and
enforce the RRA. 3 19 Therefore, Appeals Team Managers "exercise signifi-
cant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States" and should be ap-
pointed.
If a court found that Appeals Team Managers must be appointed, this
finding may not help Tucker himself. In Buckley, where the Supreme Court
found the appointment method for Federal Election Commission members
violated the Appointments Clause, the Court validated the past actions of the
Commission and further stayed its decision for thirty days, allowing Congress
a grace period to fix the problem. 32 This remedy, then, did not help anyone
who may have been injured by the improper appointment of the members up
to that point.
If Tucker wins on appeal his best case scenario is a remand to Appeals
for a new hearing, held or approved by a constitutionally appointed officer.
Tucker's goal in bringing this challenge was to secure a new hearing, specifi-
cally with an Appeals Officer, based on his perception that Settlement Offic-
ers and Appeals Account Resolution Specialists are less qualified to under-
stand and apply the intricacies of the Internal Revenue Code.321 Tucker ar-
gues that the use of Settlement Officers and Appeals Account Resolution
Specialists infringes on the rights of taxpayers because those CDP conductors
receive less training and are not as qualified as Appeals Officers.322 If a court
adopts the reasoning of this Article - that Appeals Team Managers but not
CDP conductors are officers - perhaps greater political accountability will
lead to better-trained CDP conductors and Appeals Team Managers. 323 Oth-
318. Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114, 158 (2010).
319. A finding that Appeals Team Managers are constitutional officers also could
reconcile the disagreement surrounding the phrase "officer or employee" as used once
in the RRA. See supra notes 216-17. As noted, the Tax Court relied on Congress's
use of "officer or employee" to indicate that Congress did not intend to create a con-
stitutional office. See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 154. Although congressional intent to
create an office should not be controlling, this language could be consistent with the
Appeals Team Manager holding a constitutional office, while a mere employee con-
ducted the CDP hearing. The statute uses the phrase "officer or employee" only once,
to specify who will hold the hearing. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6330. By contrast, the statute
does not say that an "officer or employee" may make the final determination. Id.
320. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 144 (1976) (per curiam).
321. Petitioner's Supplemental Reply Memorandum at 28-30, Tucker, 135 T.C.
114 (No. 3165-06L).
322. See Smith, Failure to Appoint, supra note 261, at 49.
323. Id. at 48-49.
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erwise, the perceived problem of unqualified CDP conductors will be left to
Congress to fix.324
VI. CONCLUSION
Under a more robust analysis of the phrase "established by Law," utiliz-
ing the administrative law definition of finality, Appeals Team Managers
exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States and
therefore should be appointed. This conclusion could affect many govern-
ment agencies. Our current political climate might further aggravate the ef-
fect of a holding that Appeals Team Managers have to be appointed. Su-
preme Court Chief Justice John Roberts recently commented on the congres-
325
sional stalemate in confirming judicial appointments, and many federal
agencies would face that same threat to efficient governance if the Appoint-
ment Clause is interpreted to mean that Appeals Team Managers and similar
counterparts must be confirmed with the advice and consent of the divided
Senate. But this concern is not new. Justice White noted the same problem
in Buckley: "There is no doubt that the development of the administrative
agency in response to modern legislative and administrative need has placed
severe strain on the separation-of-powers principle in its pristine formula-
tion."326 Justice White, like the Court, did not find this concern a sufficient
excuse to "create a broad exception to the requirements of that Clause." 327
Recently, the Court stated that the "fact that a given law or procedure is effi-
cient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution."328
Even though this conclusion may require a large number of new ap-
pointments, our government has faced the annual appointment of roughly
324. Tucker also may have a purely procedural problem because he raised this
challenge for the first time in the Tax Court. See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 116-17. The
Supreme Court has differed on whether this is fatal to a challenge of the authority of
one conducting a hearing. Compare Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 879 (1991)
(using the Court's discretion to hear this case even though the Appointments Clause
challenge was raised for the first time on appeal), with United States v. L.A. Tucker
Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) (holding that a claim to set aside the deci-
sion of an Interstate Commerce Commission hearing could not be maintained because
it was not raised below). Even in Freytag, four Justices did not believe the Court
should reach the issue. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 892 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
325. John Roberts, 2010 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 7-8 (Dec. 31,
2010) (transcript available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/20 1 Oyear-endreport.pdf).
326. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 280-81 (1976) (per curiam) (White, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
327. Id. at 281.
328. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3156 (2010) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)).
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240,000 military officers in the past.329 This staggering number begs the
question whether these appointments are meaningful and continue to serve
the purposes of the Appointments Clause. 330 But fixes are available. Con-
gress should streamline the process by allowing appointment by heads of
departments. Although this streamlining would require Congress to disperse
with the legislative check on the appointment power, it would allow the Sen-
ate to step back politically from those appointments, pull negative attention
away from stalemates or delays, and lighten its significant confirmation load.
The Supreme Court recognized in 1878 that the Framers added the inferior-
officers language for this reason:
[F]oreseeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden re-
movals necessary, [the primary] mode might be inconvenient, it
was provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially
mentioned, Congress might by law vest their appointment in the
President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of depart-
ments.331
Congress also has the benefit of case-by-case court determinations that ap-
pointments are needed. For example, a reversal of Tucker would only imme-
diately affect the IRS. Therefore, Congress can take advantage of this slow,
deliberate process to resolve the problem proactively for similarly situated
government actors.
The first danger of Tucker is that it threatens the political accountability
promised by the Appointments Clause. The Clause "articulates a limiting
principle" that "forbids Congress to grant the appointment power to inappro-
329. Although they are inferior officers, Justice Souter noted in Weiss that Con-
gress had not authorized an alternative appointment mechanism, leaving military
officers to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 182 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). He further
noted that the officers were reappointed upon promotion. Id. at 183. The most cur-
rent statistics available from the Department of Defense indicate that there were
226,619 active military officers in 2005, but this does not shed light on how many
appointments were necessary that year. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SELECTED
MANPOWER STATISTICS 3 (2005), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/
M0l/fy05/m0lfy05.pdf.
330. Justice Souter noted,
Writing in 1953, one observer pointed out that if each of the 49,956 nomi-
nations for military office sent to the Senate in 1949 "were considered for
one minute . . ., it would require 832 hours to pass upon the nominations
[or] an average of more than 5 hours each day that the Senate is in ses-
sion."
Weiss, 510 U.S. at 191 n.6 (alteration in original) (quoting JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE
ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 331 (1953)).
331. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878).
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priate members of the Executive Branch" 332 because "[t]he diffusion of pow-
er carries with it a diffusion of accountability."333 Even if the President ap-
proved of the encroachment, it could not stand.334 "The structural interests
protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one branch of
Government but of the entire Republic." 335 Thus, it is inappropriate for any-
one less than the President, the Head of a Department, or a Court of Law to
appoint officers. Without political accountability, the competence of those
individuals exercising significant governmental authority may suffer, which
is what Tucker suggests has happened with CDP conductors.
Whether Appeals Team Managers are hired instead of appointed may
not seem to threaten the separation of powers because they are still hired by
the Executive branch. To see the potential abuse one must take the implica-
tions of Tucker one step further. Ultimately, the Tax Court's reasoning leads
to the conclusion that Congress could empower itself to appoint CDP conduc-
tors or Appeals Team Managers as enforcers of the RRA. But this power
goes too far. The Appointments Clause permits "the reasonable implication,
even in the absence of express words, . . . that as part of his executive power
[the President] should select those who were to act for him under his direction
in the execution of the laws." 336 Conversely, "[n]either was the Legislative
Branch to have the power to appoint those who were to enforce and adminis-
ter the law." 337 In reality, it is unlikely that members of Congress are at-
tempting to appoint their friends and supporters as Appeals Team Managers
to control the enforcement of IRS collection actions, as powerful as those
332. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991).
333. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155 (2010); see also id. at 3156 ("'Even
when a branch does not arrogate power to itself,' therefore, it must not 'impair anoth-
er in the performance of its constitutional duties."' (quoting Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996))).
334. Id. at 3155 ("But the separation of powers does not depend on the views of
individual Presidents nor on whether 'the encroached-upon branch approves the en-
croachment."' (citation omitted)); Weiss, 510 U.S. at 188 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring)
("Depending on the means used to circumvent the Appointments Clause, 'diffusion'
can implicate either the anti-aggrandizement or the anti-abdication principle .... And
if Congress, with the President's approval, authorizes a lower level Executive Branch
official to appoint a principal officer, it again has adopted a more diffuse and less
accountable mode of appointment than the Constitution requires; this time it has vio-
lated the bar on abdication.").
335. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880.
336. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926), overruled in part by
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see also Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 271 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
337. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 274.
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positions may be. Yet, even where a situation seems innocuous, courts must
reject an arrangement that provides a blueprint to avoid the Constitution.3
338. FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quot-
ing Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252, 276-77 (1991)).
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